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Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? 
The Harm of Legislative Silence 
MARAH STITH MCLEOD  
This Article addresses the substantive question, “Does the death 
penalty require death row?” and the procedural question, “Who 
should decide?” 
 
In most capital punishment states, prisoners sentenced to death are 
held, because of their sentences alone, in far harsher conditions of 
confinement than other prisoners. Often, this means solitary 
confinement for the years and even decades until their executions. 
 
Despite a growing amount of media attention to the use of solitary 
confinement, most scholars and courts have continued to assume that 
the isolation of death-sentenced prisoners on death row is an 
inevitable administrative aspect of capital punishment. To the extent 
scholars have written about death row, they have focused on its 
harshness. None has objected to the fact that prison administrators 
are the ones who have decided to maintain death row in most capital 
punishment states. 
 
This Article addresses for the first time the authority of prison 
administrators to establish or retain death row. It begins by exploring 
the nature of this death row decision, and concludes that death row is 
rational only if its intended purpose is to punish. This conclusion leads 
to the second and more significant claim in the Article: that only 
legislatures are competent to require death row. This claim is 
grounded in the need for democratic legitimacy and public 
deliberation in the imposition of punishment, in the separation of 
powers, and in the principle of legality. 
 
Death row should be abolished unless legislatures choose to retain it, 
expressly and deliberately, for retributive or deterrent reasons. 
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“Even if the law were to condone or permit this added 
punishment, so stark an outcome ought not to be the result of 
society’s simple unawareness or indifference.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Life on death row has been likened to torture.2 The European Court of 
Human Rights famously refused to allow England to extradite a European 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting 
to the use of permanent solitary confinement for death row and certain other prisoners). 
 2 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 91 (1989) 
(barring extradition to Virginia because “if extradited, [the capital defendant] faces a real 
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); 
INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH) & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (CCR), 
DISCRIMINATION, TORTURE, AND EXECUTION: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA AND LOUISIANA 4 (Oct. 2013), http://ccrjustice.org/files/2013-
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citizen to face capital charges in the United States because of the risk that the 
person would end up confined on Virginia’s death row in inhuman 
conditions.3 In states like Virginia, death-sentenced prisoners are held in 
solitary confinement for the years and often decades leading up to their 
executions4—a condition so severe that, in the words of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy in a recent capital case, it may bring prisoners “to the edge of 
madness, perhaps to madness itself.”5 Many scholars and judges have attacked 
death row as barbaric and cruel; some even have concluded that death row 
inmates are being impelled to drop their appeals and “volunteer” for execution 
because life on death row is worse than death itself.6 In fact, over ten percent 
of the prisoners executed since 1976 have volunteered for execution.7  
                                                                                                                     
Death-Penalty-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UV7-GXE9] (recounting death row 
deprivations and isolation); Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the 
Shadow of Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and 
Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1598–99 (2013) (describing life on death row as 
psychological torture). 
 3 Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 91. Recently, the High Court of Ireland refused to 
extradite an Irish citizen to face terrorism-related charges in the United States, because he 
likely would face solitary confinement in the federal “supermax” prison. See Att’y Gen. v. 
Damache [2015] IEHC 339, ¶ 11.11.19 (Ir.) (“[T]he institutionalisation of solitary 
confinement . . . with its routine isolation from meaningful contact and communication 
with staff and other inmates, for a prolonged pre-determined period of at least 18 months 
and continuing almost certainly for many years, amounts to a breach of the constitutional 
requirement to protect persons from inhuman and degrading treatment and to respect the 
dignity of the human being.”). 
 4 See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 
12, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing Virginia’s 
death row policy under which every death-sentenced prisoner is locked alone for twenty-
three hours a day in a single cell enclosed by walls and a solid metal door to prevent 
communication, eats all his meals alone in his cell, has no contact visits with family or 
friends, and is denied work and educational opportunities). 
 5 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209. If a death-sentenced prisoner is brought to madness, 
however, he may not be executed. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) 
(“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a 
prisoner who is insane.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The issue is 
whether [the prisoner’s] conditions of confinement constitute punishment so harsh that he 
has been forced to abandon a natural desire to live.”); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(ACLU), A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON DEATH ROW 8 (July 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/deathbeforedying-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YBR-7S4Y] (“Facing isolated conditions, helplessness, despair, and the 
anxiety and anguish of waiting to die for years on end, many death row prisoners take 
control in the only way they know: they drop their legal appeals and ‘volunteer’ for 
execution.”); Mona Lynch, Supermax Meets Death Row: Legal Struggles Around the New 
Punitiveness in the US, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 66, 
69 (John Pratt et al. eds., 2005) (“In the case of death row inmates, the decision to give up 
appeals and volunteer for execution is potentially the product of . . . suicidal urges brought 
on by the living conditions.”); Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of 
Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 253 (2008) 
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If prisoners were executed within weeks or months, as they were two 
hundred years ago,8 death row might not warrant such attention. But today, 
death-sentenced inmates await execution for an average of fifteen-and-a-half 
years9—the amount of time that other prisoners are confined as punishment for 
serious felonies.10 Of the approximately 3,000 prisoners on death row today, 
more are likely to die of natural causes than to be executed.11 Execution delays 
                                                                                                                     
(explaining that “if the experience of living on death row creates some discernable [sic] 
pattern of psychological responses, volunteering for execution is likely only one of many 
possible outcomes”). 
 7 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC.,  
DEATH ROW U.S.A. 6 (Spring 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ 
DRUSASpring2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G597-6DG9] (reporting 1404 executions since 
1976); Information on Defendants Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated as 
“Volunteers,” DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/information-defendants-who-were-executed-1976-and-designated-volunteers [https:// 
perma.cc/G35G-49EE] [hereinafter DPIC “Volunteers”] (listing 141 “volunteers” executed 
since 1976). 
 8 Even as late as 1960, prisoners sentenced to death could expect execution within an 
average of two years. See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death 
Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 147, 181 (1998); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–65 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 9 TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.10 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4YZ-2TYX]. The most recent average recorded by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics is nine years more than it was three decades ago. See id. (reporting that 
the average number of months from sentencing to execution was 74 in 1984, 122 in 1994, 
132 in 2004, and 186 in 2013). Records from the Death Penalty Information Center reveal 
that the average time from sentence to execution for prisoners executed in 2014 was nearly 
eighteen years. See Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 [https://perma.cc/D7X7-JV43]. 
 10 Cf. ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 199 (4th ed. 2012) (“[B]ecause 
of super due process protections, capital offenders typically serve more than 20 percent of 
what otherwise might be a 50-year LWOP sentence before they are executed.”). 
 11 See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN 
AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (describing “natural causes” as the primary cause of death on 
death row); Ernest van den Haag, Commentary, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1986) (explaining that “most convicts sentenced to death are 
likely to die of old age”). Execution is now unlikely for persons sentenced to death. Of the 
8,466 defendants sentenced to death from 1973 to 2013, only 1,359 were executed. SNELL, 
supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16. Five hundred and nine died of other causes while still on death 
row. Id. And 3,586 were ultimately removed from death row due to court decisions or 
commutations. Id. Thus, most death-sentenced inmates can expect to spend years and even 
decades on death row, with a far greater likelihood that they will die on death row or be 
spared a death sentence than that they will be executed. See also James S. Liebman & Peter 
Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 255, 319 (2011) (arguing that the real penalty is “life without the possibility of 
parole, but with a small chance of execution a decade [or more] later” (emphasis omitted)); 
Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu & Edward H. Kennedy, Rate of False 
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have transformed the death penalty from relatively prompt execution into a de 
jure sentence of death and a de facto sentence of something close to life in 
prison.12 The segregation and isolation of living on death row compounds the 
suffering imposed on these prisoners by their long de facto term of 
incarceration. The unique harms caused by solitary confinement recently have 
become the focus of intensive study and media attention, with calls to end the 
use of solitary confinement based on its debilitating psychological effects.13 
                                                                                                                     
Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 7230, 7230 (2014) (noting “most death-sentenced defendants are removed from death 
row”). 
 12 In 2014, a district judge held that in California a death sentence had become not 
death but “life in prison with the remote possibility of death,” and found this penalty 
unconstitutional. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (emphasis 
omitted) (“[F]or most [prisoners], systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that 
the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly 
transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with 
the remote possibility of death. As for the random few for whom execution does become a 
reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their execution will serve 
no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbitrary.” (emphasis omitted)), rev’d sub 
nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015); see also id. (“California juries have 
imposed the death sentence on more than 900 individuals since 1978. Yet only 13 of those 
900 have been executed by the State. Of the remainder, 94 have died of causes other than 
execution by the State, 39 were granted relief from their death sentence by the federal 
courts and have not been resentenced to death, and 748 are currently on Death Row, having 
their death sentence evaluated by the courts or awaiting their execution.” (footnote 
omitted)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court’s decision 
in Jones, on the ground that it depended on a “new” constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure that the federal court lacked authority to apply on collateral review. See Jones v. 
Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 552 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 13 See, e.g., THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH. & ASS’N OF STATE CORR. 
ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
SEGREGATION IN PRISON 59 (Aug. 2015) [hereinafter ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY], 
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/asca-liman_administrative_segregation 
_report_sep_2_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6RV-E2JP]; Erica Goode, Solitary 
Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/04/health/solitary-confinement-mental-illness.html [https://perma.cc/SRX7-C55K]; 
Editorial, Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and All Too Common, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/opinion/solitary-confinement-is-cruel-common-and-
useless.html [https://perma.cc/L6W8-X5N3]; Paige St. John, California Agrees to Move 
Thousands of Inmates Out of Solitary Confinement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-will-move-thousands-of-inmates-
out-of-solitary-20150901-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZPT4-V2U3]; Timothy Williams, 
Prison Officials Join Movement to Curb Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/us/prison-directors-group-calls-for-limiting-solitary-
confinement.html [https://perma.cc/ZW9Y-5ZYK].  
This Article will focus primarily on the solitary confinement of death-sentenced 
prisoners, because such isolation is experienced by so many death row prisoners and is the 
type of confinement that most starkly contrasts with the treatment of noncapital prisoners. 
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Yet death row, and the isolation it typically entails,14 often is treated as an 
inevitable administrative aspect of a death sentence. To the extent that scholars 
and courts have focused on death row, they have objected primarily to the 
degree of its harshness and its crippling psychological effects.15 None has 
challenged the fact that prison administrators are the ones that have chosen to 
establish death row, without any legislative mandate.16 Just recently, the 
Fourth Circuit held in a Virginia case that “tethered to the death sentence in 
Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death row.”17 The court stated that, 
“Virginia law mandates that all persons convicted of capital crimes are, upon 
receipt of a death sentence, automatically confined to death row . . . because of 
the crime they have committed and the sentence they have received.”18 In fact, 
although death-sentenced prisoners in Virginia and elsewhere are sent 
                                                                                                                     
The arguments in the Article would also apply, however, to less harsh conditions of death 
row confinement. 
 14 A survey conducted by the Association of State Correctional Administrators 
(ASCA) confirmed the widespread existence of death row and the severe restrictions on 
death row inmates. See ASCA SURVEY: INMATES SENTENCED TO DEATH HOUSING POLICY 
1–8 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY], http://www.asca.net/ 
system/assets/attachments/5520/WA%20-%20Death%20Penalty%20Housing.pdf?1362689 
706 [https://perma.cc/TDE4-338B]. As scholars and courts have recognized, death row 
conditions may be significantly more severe than prison conditions for noncapital inmates, 
and may involve solitary confinement as well as segregation. See, e.g., Prieto v. Clarke, 
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (“Conditions on 
death row are more restrictive than incarceration in the general population housing units at 
[Virginia’s Sussex I State Prison], which is a maximum-security facility. The former 
amount to a form of solitary confinement: On average, plaintiff must remain in his single 
cell for all but one hour of the day.”), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 
2015); Elizabeth Compa, Cecelia Trenticosta Kappel & Mercedes Montagnes, Litigating 
Civil Rights on Death Row: A Louisiana Perspective, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 293, 313 
(2014) (“The disparity between conditions on death row and other parts of the prison in 
Virginia is not unusual.”).  
After a death warrant has been issued and execution is imminent, special conditions of 
confinement may be imposed. See e.g., 61 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4303 (West 
2010) (mandating solitary confinement with no visitors except by court order other than 
prison staff, lawyer, and spiritual advisor). This Article does not include such post-warrant 
confinement within its description of “death row.” 
 15 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 16 Some scholars have argued for amelioration or elimination of death row, but have 
argued that prison administrators should make this change. See e.g., Robert Johnson & 
John L. Carroll, Litigating Death-Row Conditions: The Case for Reform, in PRISONERS 
AND THE LAW 8-3, 8-22 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 2015) (stating that it would “be ideal if more 
correctional administrators would voluntarily and spontaneously adopt a humane approach 
to death-row confinement”); Andrea D. Lyon & Mark D. Cunningham, “Reason Not the 
Need”: Does the Lack of Compelling State Interest in Maintaining a Separate Death Row 
Make It Unlawful?, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2–4 (2005) (arguing that prison administrators 
should not continue to automatically and permanently isolate prisoners on death row 
because security does not require it). 
 17 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 18 Id. 
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automatically and permanently to death row, few jurisdictions require death 
row by statutory law. In Virginia, and in most states,19 death row is imposed 
only as a prison policy. In the words of capital punishment scholar David 
Garland, death row is “an administrative arrangement with no specific legal 
authority.”20 
This Article addresses for the first time the authority of prison 
administrators to establish death row. The analysis begins with a consideration 
of the nature of the decision to establish death row, and concludes—contrary 
to prevailing assumptions—that death row cannot be justified for 
administrative reasons. Instead, it may be justified only based on a punishment 
rationale. This conclusion leads to the second and more significant conclusion 
in the Article, which is that legislatures alone are competent to require death 
row. 
To understand the nature of the death row decision, the Article asks what 
possible purposes such confinement may serve, focusing on the traditional 
aims of incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. The first of 
these, incapacitation, closely tracks the primary administrative rationale for 
death row, which is prison security. 
Mounting evidence has undermined the claim that death row is needed for 
prison security. The most powerful evidence comes from Missouri, which 
eliminated death row over twenty years ago.21 After Missouri abolished death 
row, and began to evaluate its death-sentenced prisoners individually to 
determine their proper custody level, it discovered that the vast majority of 
them did not require isolation.22 And a follow-up study showed that after 
                                                                                                                     
 19 The Fourth Circuit stated that “Virginia law” requires death row for any death-
sentenced prisoner. Id. But the “law” the court was referring to is only the policy of the 
Virginia Department of Corrections, a policy that Virginia capital punishment statutes do 
not require and which the department may change if it wishes. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-
32.1 (2013) (providing that the Director of Corrections shall establish a system of prisoner 
evaluation and classification, with no mention of rules for death-sentenced prisoners). 
Equating statutory law and prison policy in this context perpetuates the mistaken view that 
death row is an inevitable aspect of a death sentence. Even if policies have a binding effect 
on the state, they should be distinguished from statutory laws. Cf., e.g., Wilkinson v. 
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (stating that liberty interests may arise under “state laws 
or policies”). Indeed, such a distinction will be important because statutory law may be 
used for purposes that prison policy may not (such as to establish punishment for prisoners’ 
original crimes). 
 20 GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46. Garland did not explore or discuss whether prison 
administrators’ role in establishing death row is acceptable as a normative or legal matter. 
 21 Litigation over Missouri’s death row conditions—which were far worse than 
conditions in the general prison population—led a federal court to order their amelioration 
by consent decree. Missouri’s prison administrators instead chose to eliminate death row 
and to confine the death-sentenced prisoners like noncapital prisoners. See infra note 75 
and accompanying text. 
 22 Eighty-four percent of death-sentenced prisoners in Missouri’s prison system ended 
up in general population housing, with twenty-one percent housed in the “honor dorm” for 
the best-behaved inmates. Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorensen, Is 
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elimination of death row in Missouri, the death-sentenced inmates committed 
less violent misconduct than prisoners in the same institution who had been 
sentenced to lesser terms.23 Missouri’s experience—and other studies of prison 
violence24—reveals that the automatic and permanent isolation on death row 
of all death-sentenced prisoners leads to substantial needless suffering for 
many prisoners.25 
The lack of an adequate security rationale for isolating all death-sentenced 
prisoners does not mean that death row cannot be justified, however. The 
Article next considers whether death row may serve the purposes of 
rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence. It concludes that retribution and 
                                                                                                                     
Death Row Obsolete? A Decade of Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates in Missouri, 
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 307, 316 (2005). Another six percent of death-sentenced prisoners 
were placed in special protective custody, not based on claims that they posed special risks 
to others but based on a determination that these death-sentenced prisoners themselves 
were likely to be victimized. Id. 
 23 “Violent misconduct was considered to include murder/manslaughter, attempted 
murder/manslaughter, forcible sexual assault, major assault, and minor assault.” Id. at 313. 
Prisoners sentenced to death, life without parole, and terms allowing for parole were 
considered separately. Id. at 312. The study found that death-sentenced inmates were 
60.6% as likely to engage in violent misconduct as parole-eligible prisoners (and life-
without-parole prisoners were only 50% as likely). Id. at 315. Death-sentenced inmates had 
a 0% rate of committing murders, manslaughters, or attempted murders per year, while 
life-without-parole inmates had a 0.42% rate and parole-eligible inmates had a 0.23% rate. 
Id. at 314. 
 24 See infra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
 25 Two scholars have called for the abolition of death row in light of the Missouri 
study. Mark Cunningham penned an article with law professor and law school dean Andrea 
Lyon arguing that “[i]f death-sentenced inmates represent a more, rather than less, 
manageable group of maximum security prisoners, then there is no apparent remaining 
legitimate penological justification for their confinement as a class in arduous death row 
conditions.” Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 4. Lyon and Cunningham attacked the 
“draconian” conditions of death row as based not on sound penal policy but what they 
consider to be a false “mythology” that death-sentenced prisoners are depraved and 
malevolent. Id. at 2.  
Insofar as this Article also contends that a security rationale does not justify death 
row, it aligns with much of what Lyon and Cunningham argue in greater detail in their 
article. But the analysis here differs in substantial ways from Lyon and Cunningham’s 
claims. Lyon and Cunningham conclude that death row may violate the Eighth 
Amendment when it involves severe forms of isolation, because such isolation is 
unnecessary for security. See id. at 13; see also infra note 279 (discussing Lyon and 
Cunningham’s Eighth Amendment argument). But they fail to consider whether death row 
isolation serves other legitimate purposes such as retribution or deterrence. This Article 
shows that these other aims of punishment offer plausible reasons—the only plausible 
reasons—for retaining death row. This leads to a second and more significant conclusion 
overlooked by scholars and death row litigants to date: that prison administrators lack the 
institutional competence to establish death row, because they lack the proper authority to 
prescribe punishment. The Article reveals that death row imposed by administrative 
command—as it is in most states today—should be declared invalid on structural 
constitutional grounds. 
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deterrence are plausible reasons for retaining death row. An advocate of 
retributive justice might contend that prisoners who have committed the worst 
crimes should be held in conditions that reflect the gravity of their offenses.26 
Pursuit of deterrence might lead others to support death row in the hope that 
prospective capital murderers would fear the certainty of cruel death row 
conditions, even if they might discount the possibility of execution long in the 
future. The point here is not that death row ought to be retained for these 
reasons, but only that these punishment purposes offer conceivable reasons 
why some might want to preserve it. 
Once one recognizes that death row might be retained for punishment 
reasons, the inquiry must turn to who should decide. Only legislatures are 
suited to decide whether to retain death row, for at least three reasons. First, 
legislatures have the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy in answering 
moral questions that do not admit of any empirically correct answer—such as 
the proper quantum of retributive punishment or whether to pursue retribution 
or deterrence in the first place. Second, the separation of powers grants 
legislatures alone the power to prescribe punishment.27 Third, prior statutory 
authorization of punishment is needed to satisfy the principle of legality. Each 
of these three considerations demands express legislative imprimatur before 
death row may be retained. 
Legislatures, moreover, may not be allowed simply to delegate the power 
to establish death row to prison administrators. In many states, the power to 
impose punishment is nondelegable under the constitutional separation of 
powers.28 And even in those states in which such delegation might be 
permitted, the Article contends, it would be unwise to entrust the death row 
decision to prison administrators. For prison administrators may choose to 
retain death row simply because such restrictive custody makes it 
psychologically easier for them to command and oversee the execution 
process, and not for legitimate purposes. 
The foregoing arguments present a substantial challenge to the death row 
status quo. Courts should be prepared to hold existing death row policies ultra 
vires and void, at least in those states that retain a strict separation of powers. 
Legislatures then may choose whether to enact statutes to preserve death row. 
Some may decide not to reinstate death row, perhaps because of its cruelty or 
its expense. Others may decide to authorize sentencing authorities to impose 
death row only in certain severe cases or only for a limited time. Some will do 
nothing due to legislative gridlock. All of these results would be permissible, 
and preferable, to the status quo of illegitimate administrative action. 
                                                                                                                     
 26 See ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE 
AMONG THE WORST OF THE WORST 279, 282 (2013) (arguing for harsher prison conditions 
for death row prisoners to reflect the greater severity of their crimes). 
 27 Several state courts have held that this power to punish may not be delegated to 
executive branch officials. See infra notes 205, 212 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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Some may object to this argument for legislative choice. Two main 
objections seem most likely. One goes to the breadth of the argument: Will 
legislatures be expected to micromanage all other decisions by prison 
administrators? This objection would reflect a legitimate reluctance to intrude 
upon prison decisions based on administrators’ experience and expertise. But 
death row placement differs in important ways from most or all decisions 
made by prison administrators. Three features typically set death row apart: its 
permanence, its categorical imposition, and its severity. These three 
characteristics reveal why death row is not a choice properly made by prison 
administrators, why we should care, and why reallocating power over death 
row to legislatures would not lead to micromanagement of the array of routine 
prison rules. 
The other likely objection goes to the consequences of an argument for 
legislative choice: Would not lawmakers be even less humane than prison 
administrators? William Stuntz famously explored the pathological politics of 
criminal law and the tendency of politicians to impose ever harsher penalties 
in order to appear tough on crime.29 This objection, however, overlooks the 
importance of public deliberation and democratic legitimacy in the 
prescription of punishment, limitations imposed by the separation of powers, 
and the principle of legality’s requirement of statutory authorization when 
punishment is prescribed.30 These crucial considerations do not depend on the 
consequences of legislative choice. 
The consequentialist critique also may be wrong on its own terms. More 
democratic decisions regarding death row might not lead to greater 
inhumanity. Historically, legislatures have adopted more humane methods of 
execution, for example.31 It would be hard to imagine legislatures being 
significantly harsher regarding death row than prison administrators have been 
to date. And even if some politicians would ignore humanitarian concerns, 
                                                                                                                     
 29 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 528 (2001). 
 30 Considerations of legitimacy and legality are closely linked. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights applied this understanding, for example, in a requested advisory 
opinion regarding what “law” might permissibly impose restrictions on human rights under 
the American Convention on Human Rights. See The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 6, ¶ 37 (May 9, 1986). The court explained that, 
[F]or purposes of interpretation of [the relevant article of the Convention], the 
concepts of legality and legitimacy coincide, inasmuch as only a law that has been 
passed by democratically elected and constitutionally legitimate bodies and is tied to 
the general welfare may restrict the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms of 
the individual. 
Id. 
 31 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731–32 (2015) (recounting legislative 
efforts to find “the most humane” manner of executing death-sentenced prisoners (quoting 
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890))). 
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they might agree to abolish death row for fiscal reasons, because custody 
restrictions (particularly solitary confinement) impose high costs.32 Death row 
housing has been estimated to cost nearly $100,000 more per prisoner per 
year.33 Thus, legislatures might abolish death row for many reasons, financial 
as well as humanitarian. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides background on 
development of death row in America today and how it has been established 
primarily through administrative policy. Part III explores the nature of the 
death row decision and asks whether death row is necessary for incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence.34 The Article concludes that only 
retribution and deterrence are plausible reasons for retaining death row. Part 
IV contends that because only punishment purposes possibly can justify death 
row, legislatures have the sole legal and democratic authority to establish or 
retain it. This Part further explains why legislatures ought not to delegate the 
power to establish death row to prison administrators, even if such delegation 
were permitted under law, because of the risk that prison administrators would 
retain death row for illegitimate reasons. Finally, this Part explains how courts 
can help ensure proper allocation of power over death row and prevent prison 
administrators and legislatures from exceeding their respective authorities. 
The Article answers the substantive question of whether the death penalty 
requires death row, and the procedural question of who should decide. It 
reveals that death row is unnecessary for administrative reasons and can be 
justified only for punishment purposes. Accordingly, it concludes, death row 
should be abolished unless it is required by express statutory command. 
II. DEATH ROW IN AMERICA 
This Part offers a descriptive account of death row in the United States 
today. The first Section describes three important features of death row: first, 
the dramatic increase in the duration of death row confinement over the last 
                                                                                                                     
 32 See ACLU, PAYING THE PRICE FOR SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2015), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/paying-price-solitary-confinement-aclu-
factsheet-2015/ [https://perma.cc/U55Q-AHWS]; BOHM, supra note 10, at 183–84 
(recounting studies of high costs of death row confinement); Lyon & Cunningham, supra 
note 16, at 26–27 (summarizing fiscal costs of death row in several states). 
 33 See Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A 
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty 
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S41, S104 (2011). 
 34 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (2d ed. 1995); see 
also Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of 
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1990) (“Retribution, deterrence 
(general and specific), rehabilitation, and incapacitation represent overlapping and 
antithetical perspectives on why, when, and to what degree criminals should undergo pain 
and suffering through punishment.”). The Article focuses on general deterrence, because of 
the limited relevance of specific deterrence in the death row context, see infra notes 115, 
183. 
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two centuries; second, the ways in which death row entails different and worse 
treatment of death-sentenced inmates; and third, the ways in which state 
statutes and administrative policies determine the conditions of death row 
confinement. 
A. The Prolongation of Pre-Execution Confinement 
Prisoners condemned to death in colonial days would spend days or weeks 
waiting for their executions.35 State statutes in the late 1800s usually required 
executions to be scheduled within weeks or months after sentencing.36 Until 
fairly recently, executions followed sentencing in relatively short order. 
Garland writes that “[b]efore the 1960s, the average time that American 
inmates spent awaiting execution was . . . measured in weeks and months 
rather than in years and decades.”37 In 1960, the average time from sentencing 
to execution was two years.38 Today, many prisoners spend decades on death 
row. The average time between sentencing and execution is fifteen-and-a-half 
years.39 
Pre-execution delays dramatically increase the relevance of death row for 
capital punishment. Some scholars and judges doubt that execution delays can 
be eliminated in light of prisoners’ expanding rights to constitutional review of 
their death sentences.40 History supports that claim; both federal and state 
efforts to reduce pre-execution delays have failed. Congress enacted the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)41 to speed up 
the execution process and limit federal court review of state death sentences.42 
In the year before AEDPA, the average time between sentencing and 
execution was just over eleven years.43 Two decades later, it is more than four 
                                                                                                                     
 35 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002); BOHM, 
supra note 10, at 2. 
 36 See, e.g., McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 157–58 (1891) (requiring an execution 
date within four to eight weeks); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 487 (1890) 
(discussing a Minnesota statute prescribing confinement “for a period of not less than one 
month nor more than six months”); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 163–64 (1890) (discussing 
a Colorado statute requiring an execution date within two to four weeks). 
 37 GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46. 
 38 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
Aarons, supra note 8, at 181). 
 39 SNELL, supra note 9, at 14 tbl.10. 
 40 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Consistency 
would seem to demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence as a given 
also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary 
consequence.”). 
 41 In relevant part, AEDPA has been codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d) & 2254 (2012). 
 42 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (noting “AEDPA’s purpose to 
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 420, 436 (2000))). 
 43 TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1995, at 11 tbl.11 
(Dec. 1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp95.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2FQ-XS47]. 
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years longer.44 State attempts to limit execution delays have been similarly 
unavailing. Florida, for example, codified the following provision shortly after 
Congress enacted AEDPA: “It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce delays 
in capital cases and to ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in 
capital cases are resolved within 5 years after the date a sentence of death is 
imposed in the circuit court.”45 Yet the ten persons Florida executed in the last 
two years had spent an average of over twenty years on death row;46 none of 
them had spent less than fifteen years between sentencing and execution.47 
Even if the time from sentencing to execution decreases in the future, most 
prisoners sentenced to death likely will continue to spend many years on death 
row. 
B. Current Death Row Conditions 
Death row involves the segregation of death-sentenced inmates and their 
placement in “a separate enclosure” away from other inmates.48 Today, almost 
all of the thirty-one capital punishment states49 (as well as the federal 
government and the military50) segregate their death-sentenced inmates.51 In 
                                                                                                                     
 44 SNELL, supra note 9, at 14 tbl.10. 
 45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.055 (West Supp. 2016). 
 46 Execution List: 1976–present, FLA. DEP’T CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/ 
deathrow/execlist.html [https://perma.cc/22Q3-6Y8W] [hereinafter FLA. Execution List]. 
Florida states that since 1979, the average age at time of offense has been 29.78 years, and 
the average age at time of execution has been 46.56 years, making the average time on 
death row since 1979 approximately 16.5 years. Institutions: Death Row, FLA. DEP’T OF 
CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/ [https://perma.cc/R5EC-Z5KF] [hereinafter 
FLA. Death Row]. 
 47 FLA. Execution List, supra note 46 (listing dates of sentencings and executions, the 
shortest time between which was for Juan Carlos Chavez, who was sentenced on 
November 23, 1998, and executed on February 12, 2014). 
 48 GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46. 
 49 Thirty-one states have crimes punishable by death. Nebraska was the thirty-second 
until recently. See L.B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2015) (repealing the death penalty 
over the Governor’s veto on May 27, 2015). One additional state (New Mexico) repealed 
its death penalty but only prospectively, leaving inmates on death row. See Death Row 
Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-
inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188#state [https://perma.cc/TN62-8K8N]. 
Connecticut also abolished its death penalty only prospectively, but its partial retention of 
the penalty recently was found unconstitutional. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 11 
(Conn. 2015). 
 50 The federal government houses sixty-two prisoners on death row at the U.S. 
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, which was created in 1995 as the first national death 
row facility in American history. See BOHM, supra note 10, at 105 (describing facility); 
Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/federal-death-row-prisoners [https://perma.cc/JY7R-G6AU] (last updated June 26, 
2015). The military has six prisoners on death row, which is a “secluded corridor” in the 
U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (the Department of Defense’s 
only maximum security facility). See ARMY NEWS SERV., Doing Time at Leavenworth, 
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those jurisdictions, death-sentenced inmates are housed in a unit or tier away 
from noncapital prisoners, though in some states they may be housed with 
temporarily segregated noncapital inmates also removed from the general 
prison population.52 
Death row involves more than segregation, however. Most states impose 
restrictions on death-sentenced inmates that isolate them from human 
interactions. These restrictions come in different forms, such as isolation in a 
single-person cell, confinement in cells sealed with solid walls and doors to 
prevent communication, isolation during meals (taken alone in the cell), 
isolation during exercise (in a single-person pen), denial of work opportunities 
and group programs, denial of group religious services, and visitation 
restrictions including the prohibition of contact visits with family and friends. 
A recent investigation revealed that “[m]ost death row prisoners . . . are locked 
alone in small cells for 22 to 24 hours a day with little human contact or 
interaction; reduced or no natural light; and severe constraints on visitation, 
including the inability to ever touch friends or loved ones.”53 
Isolation and denial of privileges have been common features of death row 
for many years.54 Indeed, several Supreme Court cases show that states started 
                                                                                                                     
ABOUT.COM (Dec. 16, 2014), http://usmilitary.about.com/od/justicelawlegislation/a/ 
leavenworth.htm [https://perma.cc/469Q-V3ZR] (stating that six inmates are “currently on 
death row”); Russell Goldman, Fort Hood Shooter Could Join 5 Others on Death Row, 
ABC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/militarys-death-row/story?id= 
9075282 [https://perma.cc/ZM7B-TMXL]. 
The remainder of this Article will focus on death row practices in the several states, 
because virtually all of the scholarship and empirical studies regarding death row with 
which this Article engages focus on the states. 
 51 See ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14 (providing information on the 
segregation of inmates). 
 52 In Idaho, prison policies categorize death-sentenced inmates differently from other 
offenders; death-sentenced inmates are evaluated and placed in one of two kinds of 
restrictive housing: either administrative segregation or “close-restricted custody general 
population.” DIV. OF PRISONS, IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE NO. 319.02.01.002 v3.0: 
OFFENDERS UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 07.00.00 (2016), https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/ 
content/policy/904 [https://perma.cc/R8EJ-7MTK]. In Kansas, death-sentenced inmates are 
separated from the general prison population and housed in administrative segregation with 
other segregated inmates. See Cheryl Cadue, Capital Punishment Information, KAN.  
DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.ks.gov/newsroom/capital/data [https://perma.cc/ZZ4T-
S435] (last modified Jan. 21, 2016). Colorado and South Dakota at times may hold death-
sentenced prisoners in segregation along with other prisoners who have been removed 
temporarily from the general population. In Colorado and South Dakota, death-sentenced 
inmates may be held with other inmates in administrative segregation. See ASCA HOUSING 
POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 2, 6. 
 53 ACLU, supra note 6, at 2; see also ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 43–47; 
Sandra Babcock, Death Row Conditions: State by State Comparison, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row [https://perma.cc/6MDS-KAW4] 
(follow “Death Row Conditions” hyperlink to download spreadsheet). 
 54 Although death row segregation and isolation thus are common features of capital 
punishment in America, changing penal perspectives are leading to some reductions in the 
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imposing solitary confinement on death-sentenced inmates in the late 1800s.55 
By the late 1900s, isolation of death-sentenced prisoners had become the 
norm. Scholars reported in 1997 that “while there is some variability in policy 
from state to state, death row conditions nationally are characterized by ‘rigid 
security, isolation, limited movement, and austere conditions.’”56 They noted 
that “in 35 jurisdictions death row inmates [we]re housed in individual cells. 
In 18 jurisdictions these death row inmates average[d] less than an hour daily 
of activity outside of their cells, and in five other jurisdictions out-of-cell time 
[wa]s less than three hours daily. Social visitation [wa]s non-contact in 21 of 
37 jurisdictions.”57 
Criminologist Robert Johnson has written that because death rows are 
“maintained in the same way that they were when the stay on death row prior 
to execution was minimal, . . . [w]hat formerly was a brief but debilitating 
experience has . . . become a seemingly endless and agonizing one.”58 
C. The Allocation of Decisional Power over Death Row 
Death row has become an entrenched aspect of capital punishment that 
greatly augments the punishment for capital crimes. Yet in most states, death 
row is not mentioned in capital punishment statutes. Most legislatures have 
remained silent about the practice. Instead, death row has been created by 
prison authorities as a matter of prison policy. In his book on capital 
                                                                                                                     
use of solitary confinement, including for death-sentenced inmates. Prison administrators 
in some states have decided no longer to impose automatic solitary confinement, but 
instead to grant death-sentenced inmates certain privileges and incentives for good 
behavior. See Brief of Amici Curiae Correctional Experts in Support of Appellee at 26–27, 
Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-8021). These changes have taken 
place on the prison policy level, in states where statutes do not mandate stricter treatment 
of the condemned. Id. (citing California’s two-tier classification system for death row 
inmates, which was adopted pursuant to a 1990 consent order; decisions by North Carolina 
and Colorado prison officials not to impose automatic solitary confinement on death-
sentenced inmates; and a Pennsylvania prison policy allowing prisoners to have daily time 
for out-of-cell activities). Interestingly, even in those states that have lifted the harsh rule of 
solitary confinement, death-sentenced inmates usually continue to be segregated from other 
prisoners. See ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14. This segregation preserves 
the existence of death row. 
 55 McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 
(1890); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 56 Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, 
Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
191, 204 (2002) (quoting George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace, 
Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates: The Missouri Experience and Its Legal 
Significance, 61 FED. PROB. 3, 3 (1997)). 
 57 Id.  
 58 Johnson & Carroll, supra note 16, at 8-3. 
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punishment, Garland writes that death row is “an administrative arrangement 
with no specific legal authority.”59 
Only a small number of states have statutes that require death row. 
Research for this Article has revealed four states—South Dakota,60 Texas,61 
Washington,62 and California63—that prescribe by statute the segregation of 
death-sentenced inmates and thus require the creation of death row. 
Some other states have legislated restrictions for death-sentenced inmates, 
but have not required the creation of death row. Louisiana, for example, 
mandates that death-sentenced inmates be held “in a manner affording 
maximum protection to the general public, the employees of the department, 
and the security of the institution.”64 Indiana and Mississippi statutes require 
death-sentenced inmates to be housed in maximum security facilities.65 
Wyoming requires death-sentenced inmates to be held in solitary 
                                                                                                                     
 59 GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46. 
 60 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.1 (Supp. 2015) (“From the time of delivery to 
the penitentiary until the infliction of the punishment of death upon the defendant, unless 
lawfully discharged from such imprisonment, the defendant shall be segregated from other 
inmates at the penitentiary. No other person may be allowed access to the defendant 
without an order of the trial court except penitentiary staff, Department of Corrections 
staff, the defendant’s counsel, members of the clergy if requested by the defendant, and 
members of the defendant’s family. Members of the clergy and members of the defendant’s 
family are subject to approval by the warden before being allowed access to the 
defendant.”). 
 61 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.113(b) (West 2012) (requiring single occupancy cells for 
“inmates confined in death row segregation,” as well as other inmates, including those 
confined in administrative segregation). This provision was enacted as part of a bill 
“relating to the manner in which maximum [prison] capacity is established or increased.” 
H.B. 124, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1991). Accordingly, Texas death row prisoners are 
housed “separately in single-person cells, with each cell having a window. Death row 
offenders are also recreated individually. . . . Offenders on death row do not have regular 
TDCJ-ID numbers, but have special death row numbers.” Death Row Facts, TEX. DEP’T OF 
CRIM. JUST., http://tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_facts.html [https://perma.cc/7FE8-2VRA]. 
 62 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.170 (West 2012) (requiring an inmate sentenced to 
death to “be confined in the segregation unit, where the defendant may be confined with 
other prisoners not under sentence of death, but prisoners under sentence of death shall be 
assigned to single-person cells”). 
 63 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3600(d) (West 2011) (establishing a separate classification 
system for death-sentenced inmates and referring to “condemned row [at] San Quentin 
State Prison”). 
 64 See, e.g., Compa, Kappel & Montagnes, supra note 14, at 313–14 (quoting LA. 
REV. STAT. § 15:568 (2013)) (describing how Louisiana prison officials have created a 
segregated death row with restrictions as severe as the conditions for inmates who are in 
disciplinary detention with extended lockdown). 
 65 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-4(a) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(1) 
(West 2006); see also Death Penalty, IND. DEP’T CORR., http://www.in.gov/idoc/ 
3349.htm [https://perma.cc/ZK7A-HP7W] (last updated Jan. 16, 2014) (“All offenders on 
Death Row are classified as maximum security and housed in single cells.”). 
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confinement.66 And Delaware limits visitors to inmates in maximum security, 
including death-sentenced inmates.67 Statutes in these states do not require 
death row, but they also do not forbid prison administrators from establishing 
it. And prison administrators in Wyoming, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, 
and Delaware all have chosen, then, to create death row.68 
Similarly, in the remaining states (for which research has revealed no 
statute imposing special restrictions for death-sentenced prisoners69) death row 
has been established by prison administrators. These states include Virginia, in 
which all death-sentenced inmates are held in segregation and solitary 
confinement under prison operating procedures.70 (The Fourth Circuit recently 
                                                                                                                     
 66 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-907(a) (2015) (“The administrator of the state penal 
institution shall keep a person sentenced to death in solitary confinement until execution of 
the death penalty, except the following persons shall be allowed reasonable access to the 
prisoner: (i) The prisoner’s physician and lawyers; (ii) Relatives and spiritual advisers of 
the prisoner; and (iii) Persons involved in examining a prisoner believed to be pregnant or 
mentally unfit to proceed with the execution of the sentence.”). 
 67 Death Row, DEL. DEP’T CORR., http://www.doc.delaware.gov/deathrow/ 
factsheet.shtml [https://perma.cc/K9GM-74PC] (“Inmates in maximum security including 
those sentenced to the death penalty are reviewed individually for their privilege levels 
[with up to two visits per month].”). 
 68 ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 2–4, 8. Death row inmates are 
segregated on different tiers so that they never come in physical contact with noncapital 
inmates and engage in no activities with one another except mental health group sessions. 
Id. at 12. 
This Article refers to any separate location—whether a unit, tier, or other subsection 
of a prison designed to house more than one inmate—as a form of segregation from other 
inmates if death-sentenced inmates are housed there in a way that prevents them from 
intermingling with other prisoners. Thus, a prison may have an administrative segregation 
unit housing both death-sentenced inmates as well as noncapital inmates, but the death-
sentenced inmates are “segregated” if they live in a different area of the unit from 
noncapital prisoners. This is a practice in some states. See id. 
 69 This Article does not address the special measures that are used for a limited, final 
time to prepare prisoners and prison authorities for the execution procedure after a warrant 
for execution has issued. See supra note 14. 
 70 See VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 830.2(IV)(D)(7) (2015) 
[hereinafter VA. OPERATING PROCEDURE], http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/ 
documents/800/830-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T86T-HSJZ] (“Any offender sentenced to 
Death will be assigned directly to Death Row . . . .”). Prison administrators cite two 
statutes for assigning prisoners directly to death row. Neither of these statutes mentions 
death sentences or whether death-sentenced prisoners should be treated differently from 
other prisoners. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (2013) (granting authority to the Director of 
Corrections); id. § 53.1-32.1(A) (requiring that the Director maintain a system of 
classification that “(i) evaluates all prisoners according to background, aptitude, education, 
and risk and (ii) based on an assessment of needs, determines appropriate program 
assignments including career and technical education, work activities and employment, 
academic activities . . . , counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, and such 
related activities as may be necessary to assist prisoners in the successful transition to free 
society and gainful employment”). Interestingly, because Virginia prison administrators 
have drawn from the statutory focus on rehabilitation of prisoners for “transition to free 
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upheld Virginia’s death row policy, stating that “Virginia law mandates that all 
persons convicted of capital crimes are, upon receipt of a death sentence, 
automatically confined to death row.”71 The court’s statement here, however, 
may mislead the reader. In Virginia, as in most states, there is no statutory 
mandate to hold prisoners on death row. Death row in Virginia, as in many 
other states, is a matter of administrative policy.72) 
Of the thirty-one states with capital punishment and the additional state 
with death-sentenced inmates,73 only one—Missouri—has chosen to abolish 
death row and fully integrate death-sentenced prisoners with noncapital 
inmates in a general prison population.74 Missouri’s prison administrators did 
so without any statutory mandate for or against death row, after a federal court 
issued a consent decree requiring them to ameliorate death row conditions and 
                                                                                                                     
society,” id. § 53.1-32.1(A), the negative implication is that prisoners who are destined for 
execution do not warrant such educational, work, and other programs. Prieto v. Clarke, No. 
1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (“The VDOC’s policy 
toward death row inmates largely rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that these 
inmates inherently present a greater risk to prison safety because they ‘have nothing to 
lose,’ and second, that they are less deserving of limited prison resources because they will 
never reenter society.”), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 71 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). The court 
may have perpetuated the confusion in a subsequent decision, in which it addressed the 
liberty interests of prisoners who are “sentenced to confinement in the general prison 
population,” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added), for 
prison administrators, not sentencing authorities, determine the placement of prisoners. See 
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (granting authority to the Director of Corrections); id. § 53.1-
32.1(A) (making the Director responsible for establishing a system of prisoner 
classification). 
 72 In the absence of statutory requirements, the segregation and isolation of death-
sentenced prisoners result from administrative choices. Some states publish their policies. 
See supra note 70; see also, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 291-093-0005(3) (2013), 
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_200/oar_291/291_093.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7XVX-U3L2] (“Policy: It is the policy of the Department of Corrections to assign inmates 
with a sentence of death to the Death Row Housing Unit or to a Death Row status cell.”). 
In California, the legislature has specified only that death-sentenced inmates be sent to the 
prison where executions will take place—California State Prison at San Quentin. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 3600(a), 3602, 3603 (West 2011). Death-sentenced men go there directly; 
death-sentenced women live in the Central California Women’s Facility until the end of 
their appeals. See id. §§ 3601, 3602. In contrast, in Virginia, at least one of the prison 
regulations governing death row confinement is not available on the Department of 
Corrections website and was filed under seal when challenged recently in litigation. See E-
mail from Michael Bern, Assoc., Latham & Watkins LLP (and counsel to Alfred Prieto), to 
Marah Stith McLeod, Assoc. in Law, Columbia Law Sch. (July 1, 2015, 21:31 EST) (on 
file with author). 
 73 New Mexico has abolished the death penalty only prospectively, and therefore still 
holds prisoners under a sentence of death. See Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 49. 
 74 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. Note that Maryland also mainstreamed 
its few remaining death-sentenced inmates after abolition of the death penalty, but those 
inmates received commutations of their death sentences, and therefore Maryland no longer 
has any death-sentenced inmate in its custody. 
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to establish different custody levels for death-sentenced inmates.75 In all other 
capital punishment states, death-sentenced prisoners remain segregated as they 
await execution. 
Thus, death row accompanies the death penalty in nearly every capital 
punishment state. Though a few state statutes require death row, in most states 
prison administrators simply have retained it under their operating regulations. 
It is remarkable that, in these states, prison administrators on their own have 
established what scholars and courts increasingly recognize to be an “added 
punishment”76 and even “the punishment”77 for prisoners sentenced to death. 
The next Part of this Article will show that despite its widespread use, 
death row is not an inevitable part of the death penalty. Instead, death row 
requires a choice—a normative choice about what punishment is just. 
Understanding the normative nature of the decision to establish death row 
points to the final claim of this Article, made in Part IV: that legislatures, not 
prison administrators, should decide whether to retain death row. 
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DEATH ROW 
This Article has offered a brief account of the origins, prevalence, and 
legal authority for death row. This Part will ask whether death row is 
necessary, highlighting arguments for and against death row based on the four 
traditional purposes of punishment. Whether to retain death row turns out to be 
a primarily normative question, one that requires balancing the purposes and 
harms of criminal punishment. 
A. Is Death Row Necessary to Incapacitate the Condemned? 
Death row scholars have attributed death row conditions to “assumptions 
that the nature of capital offenses renders death-sentenced inmates more likely 
to assault and injure correctional personnel and other inmates in prison, and 
                                                                                                                     
 75 See George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace, The Management of 
Death-Sentenced Inmates: Issues, Realities, and Innovative Strategies 7–8 (Mar. 1996) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/DeathSentencedInmates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JK7-KAB2] (a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy 
of Criminal Justice Sciences, Las Vegas, Nevada). A thirty-five-year veteran of Missouri’s 
Department of Corrections, George Lombardi has served as Director since 2008. Lombardi 
has written about the harsh conditions of death row prior to abolition. See id. at 8 
(“[Previously] condemned prisoners in Missouri were housed on ‘death row’ . . . [in] a 
below-ground unit . . . completely segregated from the general inmate population. With 
restrictions on movement and limited access to programs, conditions of confinement for 
death row inmates mirrored those found in other states. Death row inmates did not leave 
their housing unit. All services, including medical, recreation, food and legal materials, 
were brought to condemned prisoners. Inmates were permitted one hour of outside exercise 
each day in a small, fenced area by the unit.”).  
 76 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 77 GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46 (emphasis added). 
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that this risk is amplified by their having ‘nothing to lose.’”78 In her work on 
prison conditions, Mona Lynch has described how these assumptions have led 
some states to place death-sentenced inmates into the harsh and extremely 
isolating conditions of “supermax” confinement. She writes that “[p]enal 
administrators justify the use of Supermax as necessary to maintain internal 
security [for those] inmates who are defined as ‘the worst of the worst.’”79  
Some death-sentenced inmates have been found to pose a risk of future 
dangerousness by the sentencing jury. Two states, Texas and Oregon, allow 
the penalty of death only if the jury has made a finding of future 
dangerousness. There, the state must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”80 In 
another state, Virginia, the jury must make either a dangerousness finding, or 
alternatively find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime committed was 
“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”81 Numerous other states 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2 (quoting James Flateau, spokesman for 
the New York State Department of Correctional Services) (citing William Glaberson, On a 
Reinvented Death Row, the Prisoners Can Only Wait, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/04/nyregion/on-a-reinvented-death-row-the-prisoners-can-
only-wait.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/UQ4Y-QFZH]); see also Joint Appendix 
at 639, Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13–8021) (deposition of 
Virginia Director of Corrections Harold Clarke) (stating that death row prisoners are 
segregated because “we see those individuals as potentially the most desperate of all the 
offenders. Again, they have been sentenced to die. They have nothing to lose. They don’t 
even look forward to a life in prison in which they can improve themselves, change their 
ways, help other individuals for the rest of their life until they die of natural causes. They 
have been sentenced to die and as soon as the appeal process is completed, a date is set, 
that sentence will carry out.”). 
 79 Lynch, supra note 6, at 68. 
 80 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(B) (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, 
§ 2(b)(1) (West 2006). 
 81 Virginia law sets forth the requirements as follows: 
Conditions for imposition of death sentence. 
 
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death 
penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or 
jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the 
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his 
conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be 
imposed. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2015). Other states also authorize death sentences to be 
based on findings of dangerousness and research suggests that dangerousness 
considerations drive many capital determinations. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky 
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allow dangerousness findings to be used as an aggravating factor in capital 
sentencing.82 
Assessments of future dangerousness to society in death sentencing have 
been attacked as inaccurate, unjust, and perhaps not even relevant where the 
alternative to a death sentence is life without parole (dangerousness to society 
having begun to be considered at a time when the alternative to a death 
sentence was a parole-eligible term).83 Despite their claimed inaccuracy, 
unfairness, and possible irrelevance, however, such future dangerousness 
findings continue to be cited not only to support death sentences but to support 
death row conditions. Indeed, prison officials in Virginia recently argued that 
death-sentenced inmates categorically warrant stricter conditions of 
confinement because their sentences are based on findings that they either 
would commit violent crimes again or that their crimes were particularly 
vile.84  
Several notable escapes from death row have contributed to the belief that 
death-sentenced inmates are particularly dangerous and hard to control. In his 
historical study of capital punishment in the United States, Robert Bohm 
recounts several well-publicized escapes of death row inmates over the last 
fifty years:85 A woman, Marie Arrington, escaped from Florida’s death row in 
1969; six inmates escaped from Oklahoma’s death row in 1972; four inmates 
escaped from Georgia’s death row in 1980; six inmates escaped from 
Virginia’s death row in 1984; six inmates attempted (and one succeeded in) an 
escape from Texas’s Huntsville prison in 1998; and another death row inmate 
escaped from a county jail in Houston in 2005 after attending a resentencing.86 
                                                                                                                     
L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder 
Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1252–53 (2000).  
 82 See Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce & Robert F. Schopp, 
Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
471, 479 (2004). These states include Missouri. See State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 543–
44 (Mo. 2010) (allowing prosecutors to argue future dangerousness as a non-statutory 
aggravating factor). 
 83 See, e.g., John F. Edens, Jacqueline K. Buffington-Vollum, Andrea Keilen, Phillip 
Roskamp, & Christine Anthony, Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder 
Trials: Is It Time to “Disinvent the Wheel?,” 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 58 (2005); see also 
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate Data in Violence Risk 
Assessments at Capital Sentencing, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 71, 71–72 (1998). Future 
dangerousness not only is difficult to predict, but predictions may be based on unrealistic 
consideration of whether a guilty defendant would kill if released rather than whether he 
would kill if kept in prison. On that topic, a recent article exposed how Virginia does not 
allow the jury to hear evidence regarding the effect of prison conditions on future 
dangerousness. See Andrew Lindsey, Death by Irrelevance: The Unconstitutionality of 
Virginia’s Continued Exclusion of Prison Conditions Evidence to Assess the Future 
Dangerousness of Capital Defendants, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1257 (2014). 
 84 Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 54–56, Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 
(4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-8021); see supra note 81 and accompanying text (citing statute). 
 85 BOHM, supra note 10, at 177–78. 
 86 Id. 
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These escapes caused great alarm, fueled by disturbing media reports.87 In 
Virginia, the Mecklenberg prison became renowned for the death row escape 
debacle.88 The escape led to a bevy of investigations, which resulted in 
recommendations for better prison organization and morale through measures 
that included “increased job, recreational and educational opportunities for 
inmates.”89 Ultimately, however, Virginia prison officials chose to eliminate 
opportunities for death-sentenced inmates, rather than to enhance them to 
encourage good behavior: Death row was transferred to Sussex I State Prison, 
where death-sentenced prisoners now live in solitary confinement.90 Virginia 
correctional officials have cited the 1984 escape incident to explain why the 
current death row strictures are necessary.91 
Despite the alarm generated by these escapes, however, the risk of escape 
offers only a weak reason for condemning death-sentenced prisoners 
categorically to harsher confinement. Though escapes by death-sentenced 
prisoners may generate publicity,92 research for this Article has found no study 
or claim asserting that death-sentenced prisoners attempt to escape at higher 
rates than other murderers sentenced to lesser penalties, or that death-
sentenced prisoners are more likely than such other murderers to commit 
violence during an escape.93 Indeed, the escapes of death-sentenced prisoners 
                                                                                                                     
 87 See id. at 204 (citing news coverage). 
 88 When authorities decided to close the prison many years later, news articles 
focused on this aspect of its history. See, e.g., McDonnell Orders Mecklenburg 
Correctional Center Closed, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.richmond.com/archive/article_7d15ef34-b4b3-5b72-87a0-3d4a6767b563.html 
[https://perma.cc/U3TT-NWS4] (“About 300 people work at the Southside Virginia prison, 
which in 1984 was the site of the nation’s largest death row escape . . . .”). 
 89 DARYL CUMBER DANCE, LONG GONE: THE MECKLENBURG SIX AND THE THEME OF 
ESCAPE IN BLACK FOLKLORE 98 (1987). 
 90 See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that all death-
sentenced inmates in Virginia are “housed in the same portion of Sussex I, known widely 
as Virginia’s ‘death row.’”); id. at 253–54 (rejecting death row inmate’s due process claim 
for a right to housing in non-solitary confinement). Recent reports suggest that prison 
administrators have ameliorated death row conditions in Virginia, apparently in order to 
stave off further litigation. See Alanna Durkin, Virginia Quietly Grants Death Row Inmates 
New Privileges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 16, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2412 
9250f1b74fefb1c4d4921f3aa199/virginia-quietly-grants-death-row-inmates-new-privileges 
[https://perma.cc/3QJD-CQRF]. 
 91 Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 84, at 15–16 (“Director Clarke 
explained his concern that permitting death-row offenders to congregate with other 
prisoners would pose an unacceptable safety risk. He described an incident in the 1980s in 
which death-row inmates who had been permitted to congregate at the maximum security 
prison in Mecklenberg ‘staged a mass escape,’ an incident that ‘could have been 
catastrophic’ had they not been apprehended.” (quoting Joint Appendix at 643)). 
 92 See BOHM, supra note 10, at 177–78 (recounting the history of death row escapes). 
 93 Bohm does not offer comparative evidence, unfortunately, between rates of escape 
by death-sentenced inmates and noncapital inmates (such as LWOP or life inmates). See id.  
Studies have found that, generally speaking, only a small fraction of prison escapes 
lead to injuries to staff. See, e.g., Richard F. Culp, Frequency and Characteristics of Prison 
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over the years have not resulted in the death of any third party.94 All were 
recaptured, except for two who died before being found.95 With regard to the 
risk of death row escapes, an event that occurred in 2004 in Arkansas is 
telling. For three minutes, all the death row cell doors were accidentally 
unlocked.96 Though apparently aware, no death row inmate left his cell.97 
Quoted in a news report after the incident, the spokeswoman for the Arkansas 
prison system recounted: “[The prisoners] sat there. They didn’t 
move. . . . [T]he death row inmates are the best behaved inmates in prison.”98 
In other words, the data we have suggests, at the very least, that not every 
prisoner sentenced to death is a prisoner likely to escape or commit violence in 
the future.99 The claimed risk of escape by capital inmates is simply 
insufficient to warrant subjecting every death-sentenced inmate automatically 
to the harshness of permanent isolation. 
More importantly, recent and ongoing evidence further undercuts the 
general assumption that death-sentenced inmates will always be exceptionally 
dangerous. The best evidence comes from the Missouri prison system, which 
                                                                                                                     
Escapes in the United States: An Analysis of National Data, 85 PRISON J. 270, 285, 287 
(2005) (describing a study of news reports regarding escapes over a two-year period in 
which “[e]scapees used violence against prison staff in only . . . 8.3% of the escapes,” 
“none of the incidents resulted in life-threatening injuries,” and “all of the escaped 
prisoners involved . . . were subsequently captured, most within a few days of the escape”). 
Unfortunately, studies offer little means to compare rates of escape by prisoners sentenced 
to terms of years and death-sentenced prisoners. Indeed, some studies code death sentences 
as terms of years. See, e.g., Bryce E. Peterson, Inmate-, Incident-, and Facility-Level 
Factors Associated with Escapes from Custody and Violent Outcomes 105 n.24 (Feb. 1, 
2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York), http://academic 
works.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=gc_etds [https://perma.cc/GVP2-
FQ83]. 
 94 BOHM, supra note 10, at 178. 
 95 Id. (describing the recapture of all escapees but two who were found dead). The 
bodies of the two who died were found within a week of their escapes; one was found 
beaten to death and the other had apparently drowned (in a separate incident). Id. 
 96 Death-Row Cells Are Unlocked by Accident, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2004), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/30/nation/na-briefs30.1 [https://perma.cc/3T7R-D4J4]. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (quoting Dina Tyler, spokeswoman for the Arkansas prison system). 
 99 There may be reasons why death-sentenced inmates might not be more likely to 
escape or more likely to commit violence, as a category, than murderers sentenced to lesser 
terms. As an initial matter, though death row prisoners often are treated as a unique 
category, their crimes do not necessarily set them apart from all other prisoners. Other 
inmates may have committed capital crimes, but had prosecutors who did not pursue the 
death penalty, avoided the death penalty through plea bargains, or faced juries that 
exercised mercy. Death-sentenced prisoners, moreover, may be older on average. In 2013, 
death-sentenced prisoners had a mean age of forty-seven and a median age of forty-six. See 
SNELL, supra note 9, at 10 tbl.5. In contrast, that same year less than thirty percent of all 
state and federal prisoners, including noncapital prisoners, were over forty-four years old. 
See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 8 tbl.7 (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8F7-7D9A]. 
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abolished death row and integrated its death-sentenced inmates with 
noncapital inmates at its maximum security Potosi Correctional Center over 
twenty years ago.100 Rather than automatically sending every death-sentenced 
prisoner into high-security segregation on death row, Missouri prison officials 
began to evaluate each prisoner individually for risk of institutional violence 
and to determine a custody level accordingly.101 For the first time, evidence of 
likely institutional behavior (including a variety of factors such as 
psychological traits and past prison behavior), rather than the mere fact of a 
death sentence, mattered for placement in segregation.102  
As a result of the integration, within just over a decade eighty-four percent 
of the death-sentenced inmates in the Missouri prison system (then sixty-two 
prisoners) had been placed in some form of general population housing, 
including twenty-one percent who were placed in the “honor dorm” reserved 
for exceptionally well-behaved inmates.103 Prisoners in the honor dorm 
remained out of their cells at all times except during roll call.104 Only five 
percent of the death-sentenced prisoners had required segregated confinement 
due to the risks they posed to others or for disciplinary reasons.105 The 
abolition of death row greatly improved life for death-sentenced prisoners, 
and—according to the current Director of the Missouri Department of 
Corrections, George Lombardi—also improved the “general climate and 
environment of the institution.”106 
When studying reports from the Missouri Department of Corrections 
eleven years after mainstreaming, forensic psychologists Mark Cunningham 
and Thomas Reidy, assisted by criminal justice professor Jon Sorensen, made 
several surprising discoveries.107 They found that the mainstreamed death-
sentenced inmates were significantly less likely to commit violent misconduct 
than prisoners sentenced to a term of years in the same facility.108 Indeed, the 
rate of violent misconduct for death-sentenced inmates (and also for prisoners 
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP)) was only one-fifth of the rate of 
violent misconduct among parole-eligible inmates at the same facility.109 
Even after accounting for predictor variables such as age and education, 
the findings were remarkable: “Controlling for all of these predictor 
                                                                                                                     
 100 For the history of Missouri’s abolition of death row, see generally Lombardi, 
Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56. 
 101 See Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22, at 311. 
 102 See id. at 310–11. 
 103 Id. at 316 (recounting this information based on a personal communication with 
Don Roper, then the superintendent of Potosi Correctional Center). 
 104 Id. at 311. 
 105 Id. at 312. 
 106 Lombardi, Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56, at 7. 
 107 Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22. Mark Cunningham has advised 
this author in a personal telephone conversation on March 3, 2015, that he is conducting a 
follow-up study that will update the results of his study of the Missouri experience.  
 108 Id. at 315. 
 109 Id. at 316. 
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variables . . . death-sentenced and LWOP inmates were half as likely to engage 
in violent misconduct as term-sentenced inmates housed under similar 
conditions of confinement at [Potosi Correctional Center].”110 Furthermore, 
none of the death-sentenced inmates attempted to escape during the study 
period, and Cunningham has heard of no subsequent escape attempt by a 
death-sentenced inmate in Missouri.111 
The fact that both LWOP and death-sentenced inmates “were significantly 
less likely than parole eligible inmates to be involved in violent 
misconduct”112 bears attention. For LWOP inmates, like death-sentenced 
inmates, have little hope of release.113 The evidence from Missouri thus 
unsettles the claim that such prisoners categorically pose higher risks and 
therefore must be confined more strictly. 
At least two factors may explain why mainstreamed death-sentenced 
inmates would commit relatively low rates of misconduct. The first reason is 
that these inmates acquire something to lose when they are given more 
privileges.114 When death-sentenced inmates are not automatically and 
categorically segregated and isolated on death row, the threat of segregation 
and isolation may be used to deter them from misconduct, just as this threat 
deters noncapital prisoners from prison misconduct. This would explain why 
Missouri’s mainstreamed inmates committed relatively low levels of violent 
misconduct. It might also explain why they did not attempt to escape, for if 
recaptured they faced return to solitary confinement as a consequence.115 
A second reason may help explain why death-sentenced inmates in the 
Missouri study committed less violent misconduct than inmates with lower 
sentences: Death-sentenced inmates may view prison differently because they 
expect to be there for the rest of their lives. They may see the importance of 
establishing a good reputation and good rapport with prison officials more 
                                                                                                                     
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. Cunningham stated to this author in February 2015 that to date, his research has 
revealed no attempts to escape by the death-sentenced inmates who were mainstreamed in 
Missouri. 
 112 See id. at 313. 
 113 See BOHM, supra note 10, at 181 (describing how LWOP and death-sentenced 
inmates may be seen to have little to lose because both have no hope of release). 
 114 Lombardi, Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56, at 7. 
 115 The mainstreamed prisoners’ temporary experience of life in isolation on death row 
may have had a specific deterrent effect, for it gave them a personal understanding of the 
hardship of isolated confinement—to which they might be returned based on misconduct. 
See infra note 183. (discussing whether temporary placement on death row might serve 
specific deterrence purposes). An updated study of the conduct of Missouri death-
sentenced inmates would lend insight into whether prisoners’ former placement on death 
row has had a specific deterrent effect on them. Mark Cunningham has indicated to the 
author that he plans to conduct such a study. No reports to date suggest that violence 
among death-sentenced prisoners in Missouri has increased. And the Director of 
Corrections continues to post prominently on his state website his article lauding the 
positive effects of abolishing death row in Missouri. See Office of the Director, MO. DEP’T 
CORR., https://doc.mo.gov/OD/ [https://perma.cc/T7G9-AEGH]. 
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than inmates who expect to spend a shorter time in prison.116 They may 
recognize that the loss of even small privileges, such as contact visits with 
family and increased time for recreation, may affect dramatically their quality 
of life over the long term. This long-term view could explain why death-
sentenced and LWOP inmates would commit less violent misconduct than 
parole-eligible inmates, and why LWOP inmates would commit the least 
violence of all.117  
The mainstreaming experience in Missouri offers strong empirical support 
for the claim that not all death-sentenced inmates pose a higher risk of prison 
violence.118 Earlier studies bolster that account, though they did not study 
prisoner conduct after abolition of death row. Some studies revealed relatively 
low rates of violence for inmates who were still on death row.119 Other studies 
found relatively low rates of violence of former death row inmates who, after 
their death sentences were vacated, were incarcerated in the general 
population.120 The Missouri study also accords with broader studies of 
recidivism, which show that a crime of conviction is a poor predictor of 
                                                                                                                     
 116 Timothy Flanagan’s extensive studies have documented this explanation for the 
behavior of long-term inmates. See Timothy J. Flanagan, Long-Term Incarceration: Issues 
of Science, Policy and Correctional Practice, in LONG-TERM IMPRISONMENT: POLICY, 
SCIENCE, AND CORRECTIONAL PRACTICE 3, 5 (Timothy J. Flanagan ed., 1995). 
 117 Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22, at 313. Furthermore, the possibility 
of enhancing the likelihood of post-conviction relief might also motivate death-sentenced 
inmates toward good behavior. A federal court recently noted, in rejecting the claim that 
death-sentenced inmates have “nothing to lose”: “Death row inmates have obvious 
incentives to behave well and take rehabilitation seriously, including the possibility that 
new forensic evidence might undercut a conviction, a habeas petition might be granted, or 
that good behavior might improve the prospects of a commuted sentence.” Prieto v. Clarke, 
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), rev’d on other 
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 118 No evidence suggests that Missouri’s corrections facility or death-sentenced 
prisoners are so different as to make this evidence inapplicable elsewhere. Nor does the 
Cunningham study of the Missouri experience suggest that good behavior was simply the 
immediate result of the transition and due to the inmate’s recent experience with the 
suffering of death row (segregation to which they would not want to be returned for 
committing acts of prison violence). See Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22. 
 119 See, e.g., Jon Sorensen & Robert D. Wrinkle, No Hope for Parole: Disciplinary 
Infractions Among Death-Sentenced and Life-Without-Parole Inmates, 23 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 542, 547 (1996). Such studies offered important information, but could not 
exclude the possibility that violence had been suppressed by death row confinement 
measures. 
 120 See, e.g., Thomas J. Reidy, Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, From Death 
to Life: Prison Behavior of Former Death Row Inmates in Indiana, 28 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 62, 70 (2001); see also Sorensen & Wrinkle, supra note 119, at 542. These studies 
avoided the problem of security effects, and provided important insights indicating that 
most capital offenders did not pose special risks of violence. But they could not foreclose 
the possibility that death row prisoners became less dangerous because they no longer 
faced execution or remembered and wanted to avoid being placed in segregated 
confinement again. 
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violence in prison. Specifically, studies have indicated that “a murder 
conviction is not predictive of a greater risk of prison violence relative to a 
conviction for some other offense.”121 And “research has consistently found 
the true incidence of recidivism among murderers released from prison to be 
much lower than for other types of parolees.”122 Furthermore, studies have 
shown that the risk of violence by prisoners decreases significantly as they 
age.123 Many death row prisoners are quite old; a recent government report 
counted over 350 death row inmates aged sixty or older.124 In the last decades, 
hundreds have died awaiting execution.125 As death-sentenced prisoners age in 
the many years leading up to execution, their permanent isolation on death row 
becomes less and less justified for security reasons. An accumulating body of 
evidence thus supports the claim that death-sentenced inmates do not pose 
exceptional security threats as a categorical matter. 
This growing evidence has undercut the dangerousness rationale for death 
row. Security needs do not require a death sentence to be dispositive for 
automatic and permanent placement on death row. Individual assessments of 
death-sentenced offenders offer a way to determine which inmates require 
more restrictive confinement—assessments that are made routinely for 
noncapital prisoners.126 
                                                                                                                     
 121 Jon Sorensen & Mark D. Cunningham, Conviction Offense and Prison Violence: A 
Comparative Study of Murderers and Other Offenders, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 103, 123 
(2010). Perhaps, one might argue, death-sentenced inmates commit even less violence if 
they are kept in isolation on segregated death rows. Some researchers suggest otherwise—
arguing that the isolation can catalyze violence. The United Kingdom’s Chief Inspector of 
Prisons found that the use of solitary confinement was causing inmates to become more 
violent. See Alan Travis, Solitary ‘Makes Dangerous Inmates Worse,’ GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 
2000), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/22/alantravis [https://perma.cc/X57N-L9RQ]. 
In any case, the argument for less misconduct would justify stricter security measures for 
other, noncapital prisoners as well. The question remains: why create death row? 
 122 Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 81, at 1254. The recidivism question seems 
important. Jonathan Sorensen has argued that “both correctional administrators and inmates 
agree that murderers are generally among the most docile and trustworthy inmates in the 
institution.” Id. at 1256. With regard to death-sentenced inmates, he notes that death row 
inmates whose penalties were commuted after Furman had a low rate of recidivism. See id. 
at 1255. 
 123 See, e.g., CARLYNE L. KUJATH, DAN PACHOLKE, DAVE DANIELS & BRUCE STEGNER, 
WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., PRISON VIOLENCE: PRELIMINARY STUDY 2 (Oct. 2009) 
(“Analyses indicated a negative relationship between age and violent behavior (e.g., as age 
increased, the number of violent infractions decreased). This suggests that older offenders 
are less likely than younger offenders, to be violent.”), http://www.doc.wa.gov/aboutdoc/ 
measuresstatistics/docs/PrisonViolence2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QEZ-M6M5]. 
 124 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 21 app. tbl.1. 
 125 See supra note 11. 
 126 The district court in the Virginia death row case mentioned above reached this 
conclusion, finding that the Virginia prison administrators’ concerns for security could be 
adequately addressed through individual assessments of death-sentenced inmates for 
dangerousness. See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *11 (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (“[D]efendants could provide plaintiff with an individualized 
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But it is not yet clear that death row serves no legitimate penological 
purpose. For other traditional punishment purposes—rehabilitation, 
retribution, and deterrence—still might be served by death row.127 Without 
considering these other purposes of punishment, one cannot conclude that 
death row has no legitimate place in capital punishment. The Article now will 
turn to whether death row may serve the aim of rehabilitation. 
B. Is Death Row Necessary to Rehabilitate the Condemned? 
Historically, states hoped that pre-execution confinement would facilitate 
rehabilitation of the offender. In colonial days, executions were delayed 
intentionally for up to a few weeks to enable death-sentenced inmates to 
meditate on their crimes and potential damnation, and with the help of visits 
from clergy, to express remorse and repent.128 Pre-execution confinement thus 
                                                                                                                     
classification determination using procedures that are the same or substantially similar to 
the procedures used for all non-capital offenders, as plaintiff requests.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). While the decision of the district court recently was 
reversed, that aspect of the decision was not rejected. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 
251 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the prisoner did not have a liberty interest triggering a 
right to procedural review before confinement on death row). 
As a group of corrections experts recently argued in the Prieto case, moreover, 
individual assessments rather than automatic and permanent isolation are a sufficient and 
effective method to preserve prison security. See Brief of Amici Curiae Correctional 
Experts in Support of Appellee, supra note 54, at 3 (“Amici have first-hand experience in 
safely managing death-sentenced and other maximum-security populations. . . . It is 
amici’s view that the Virginia Department of Corrections policy of automatically and 
permanently placing death-sentenced prisoners in solitary confinement is a violation of 
prisoners’ due process rights and serves no correctional purpose.”). The amicus brief cited 
evidence from Missouri as well as other studies on the comparative non-dangerousness of 
capital inmates. See id. at 23–28. The state had opposed vigorously the consideration of 
this amicus brief. See Commonwealth’s Opposition to Correctional Experts’ Motion to File 
Amicus Brief, Prieto, 780 F.3d 245 (No. 13-8021). But, in testimony, even the Virginia 
prison director conceded that some death-sentenced inmates do not pose a higher risk than 
noncapital inmates. See Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 54–55, Prieto, 780 F.3d 
245 (No. 13-8021) (“In fact, however, Director Clarke himself expressly agreed that there 
are ‘individuals within death row who are less of a security risk than particular individuals 
in the general population.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 657)). Based on such evidence, the 
district court concluded that prison administrators’ policy of automatically placing all 
death-sentenced inmates in solitary confinement on death row was based on unsupported 
“assumptions” about the dangerousness of death-sentenced inmates and “further[ed] few, if 
any, legitimate penological goals.” Prieto, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8. 
 127 In his history of the death penalty, Banner notes that capital punishment enjoyed 
widespread support in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for three main purposes: 
deterrence, retribution, and penitence. See BANNER, supra note 35, at 23. 
 128 BOHM, supra note 10, at 2. Banner also recounts that in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, “[t]he condemned person was normally allowed at least a week or 
two, and often several weeks, to get ready to die.” BANNER, supra note 35, at 17. Though 
execution delay “attenuat[ed] the link between the crime and the punishment” and created a 
risk of escape, “governments continued to allow sufficient time for repentance” and 
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was designed to rehabilitate the soul of the offender. This purpose of pre-
execution confinement can be seen in the words of Massachusetts Chief 
Justice Lemuel Shaw in 1839, when he warned a defendant he was sentencing 
to death to use his remaining time in preparation for “the great change that 
awaits you.”129  
Some remnants of the historical aim of rehabilitation appear in current 
death row policy, despite the fact that secular aims largely have displaced 
religious purposes in American penal policy.130 Some statutes still expressly 
provide for visitation by clergy to death row inmates.131 And some prison 
administrators have sought to make death row an environment that draws 
inmates’ thoughts toward God.132 Literature and books have depicted famous 
religious conversions on death row.133 
                                                                                                                     
provided for a “steady stream of ministers” to visit the inmates and encourage their 
conversation and penitence. See id. at 17–19. 
 129 LEMUEL SHAW, REMARKS OF CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW WHEN PASSING SENTENCE OF 
DEATH UPON NATHAN SMITH, FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER, JUNE 7, 1839, at 6 (1839). Note 
that one might also see retributive goals to be served by penitence; Michael Simons has 
written that “repentance exacts a punishment from the defendant.” Michael A. Simons, 
Born Again on Death Row: Retribution, Remorse, and Religion, 43 CATH. LAW. 311, 331 
(2004). 
 130 Cf. BOHM, supra note 10, at 3 (“Penitence is no longer an ostensible goal of capital 
punishment. . . . In addition, with the current separation of church and state, religion no 
longer has the influence in secular affairs as it did during colonial times.”). 
 131 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.1 (Supp. 2015) (barring access to the 
prisoner by anyone except correctional staff, “the defendant’s counsel, members of the 
clergy if requested by the defendant, and members of the defendant’s family”); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.17 (West 2006) (barring all persons outside the prison from 
access to a death-sentenced inmate “except his or her physician, lawyer, and 
clergyperson, . . . and the relatives and friends of the condemned person”); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-13-907(a) (2015) (requiring death-sentenced inmates to be held in solitary 
confinement but allowing certain visitation including by “spiritual advisers of the 
prisoner”). 
 132 See Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral 
Disengagement in the Execution Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 377 (2005) 
(describing one of the penitentiaries studied as focused strongly on directing death row 
inmates toward religious development through means including religious counseling and 
religious art). 
 133 See, e.g., HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: THE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY THAT SPARKED A NATIONAL DEBATE 244 (1994); DEAD MAN 
WALKING (PolyGram Films 1995). 
Some scholars have argued that newfound faith on death row may be a reason to 
conclude that a death-sentenced inmate should not be executed after all, either because he 
is no longer deserving of death or because he is no longer too dangerous to keep alive. See, 
e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The 
Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1633 (1998) (“In short, 
if jurors believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had done, they tended to 
sentence him to life imprisonment, not death.”); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and 
Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 171 
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (citing Dead Man Walking to show how remorse impacts 
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The historical rehabilitative purpose of pre-execution confinement, 
however, now offers little reason for death row. Pre-execution confinement 
lasts far too long to provide the temporal pressure that historically was seen to 
foster repentance. In 1839, New York minister John McLeod explained the 
importance of a short period of pre-execution confinement: 
May we not fairly reason from what we know of the nature of the mind, and 
the deceitfulness of sin, that the criminal will be more likely to give all the 
energies of his mind to the work of preparation for meeting his God, when he 
knows that his days are numbered, than when they appear to him to be 
lengthened out indefinitely?134 
Today, prisoners who are executed spend an average of a decade and a 
half on death row—and most prisoners sentenced to death are not executed at 
all.135 The religiously oriented purpose of pre-execution confinement would 
seem at most to justify special prison conditions designed to focus the prisoner 
on his eternal fate for the limited period immediately preceding his 
execution.136  
One scholar has suggested an alternative, secular rehabilitative purpose for 
the segregated confinement of death-sentenced prisoners. Criminologist 
Robert Johnson has argued for a “humane death row,” where death-sentenced 
inmates receive more caring treatment than other inmates. He contends that 
prisons should provide a special type of confinement for death-sentenced 
inmates that would mitigate the psychological and physical harms of pre-
execution delay and prepare them for a dignified death. He argues that death-
sentenced inmates are “persons in the process of dying at the hands of the 
state, a class of individuals analogous to and as deserving of humane care as 
                                                                                                                     
social judgments of character and desert); Simons, supra note 129, at 322 (noting that a 
jury faced with evidence of a capital defendant’s religious transformation “may have 
considered it relevant to [the defendant’s] desert (i.e., not simply relevant to his future 
dangerousness)”). 
 134 BANNER, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting New York minister John McLeod). 
 135 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 136 It seems hard to imagine that death-sentenced inmates would spend so many years 
“giv[ing] all the energies of [their] mind[s] to the work of preparation for meeting [their] 
God,” BANNER, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting New York minister John McLeod), 
particularly when they (or their lawyers) know that they will not be executed until the end 
of appellate and post-conviction review. The idea that prisoners on death row today 
constantly fear imminent execution seems implausible, though it has been made in 
prominent scholarship. See, e.g., Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense 
of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 407, 462 (2005) (“During the time an offender is on death row, he constantly 
fears that today is the day death comes knocking, making it hard for him to actually lend 
much thought to the values animating retributive justice.”); Sun, supra note 2, at 1613 
(describing life on death row as “life in perpetual fear of state-implemented death, whose 
timing is impossible to predict”). 
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terminally ill patients.”137 He envisions death row as a kind of hospice.138 
Johnson’s vision of death row would require states to treat death-sentenced 
inmates better than noncapital inmates; it seems to justify the creation of death 
row, but one very different from the harsh death row we see today. 
Many scholars have argued that death row as it exists today degrades 
rather than rehabilitates. Mona Lynch describes the harsh conditions of death 
row as part of a “post-rehabilitative, ‘waste management’ new penological 
regime.”139 Lynch writes that death row conditions are “literally transforming 
those waiting to die from sociologically and psychologically rich human 
beings into a kind of untouchable toxic waste that need only be securely 
contained until its final disposal.”140  
To prison administrators who decide death row policy, rehabilitation may 
seem pointless. In the litigation over Virginia death row conditions in the 
Prieto case mentioned above, state prison officials defended the categorical 
denial of work and educational privileges to death-sentenced inmates on the 
ground “that they are less deserving of limited prison resources because they 
will never reenter society.”141 This utilitarian argument ascribes little or no 
                                                                                                                     
 137 ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 
213 (2d ed. 1998). Johnson states that a humane death row “would be staffed by mature, 
service-oriented correctional officers able to relate to condemned prisoners as persons in 
the process of dying at the hands of the state, a class of individuals analogous to and as 
deserving of humane care as terminally ill patients.” Id. He writes that: 
Visits would be encouraged, as would recreational activities and “programs of work or 
study that can take place in cells or in small groups.” Also encouraged would be “self-
help programs, preferably developed by and for the prisoners,” which would be 
promoted as “collective adaptations to the stresses of death row confinement” and 
impending execution. 
Id. at 214 (quoting Robert Johnson, Life Under Sentence of Death, in THE PAINS OF 
IMPRISONMENT 142–44 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988)). 
 138 Id. at 213–14. 
 139 Lynch, supra note 6, at 79. Echoing Michel Foucault but without directly citing 
him, Sharon Dolovich has made similar claims about the American “carceral state” as a 
whole. See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 259, 318 (2011). Both of these approaches treat conditions of confinement as 
efforts at subjugation and exclusion of certain offenders, not as the punishment calibrated 
to a particular crime. In this sense, their vision does not offer an explanation of death row 
as necessary to capital punishment but instead as a reflection of broader, excessively harsh 
carceral norms. 
 140 Lynch, supra note 6, at 79. 
 141 Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 
2013), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Perhaps the officials meant to 
say that death-sentenced prisoners “are less deserving of limited prison resources because 
they will never enter prison society.” If the view were premised instead on the idea that 
death-row inmates will not be released, the same rationale would justify subjecting LWOP 
inmates to harsh treatment as well. See id. (“[The rationale for limiting resources spent on 
inmates who will not reenter society is] also inconsistent with [prison] practices. Compare 
the treatment of inmates sentenced to death and those sentenced to life imprisonment 
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value to the human development of prisoners who are marked for execution, 
treating such inmates, in Lynch’s words, as human “waste.”142  
But the argument that rehabilitation is wasted on death row inmates 
because they will never reenter ordinary society, or even prison society, 
presumes that death-sentenced inmates will be executed. That is not true. 
Many death-sentenced inmates will not be executed. Recent records from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that over forty percent of the persons 
sentenced to death between 1976 and 2013 were removed from death row due 
to court decisions or commutations.143 An earlier and more detailed study 
conducted by James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West had found that 
over half of capital sentences from 1973 to 1995 were reversed based on 
prejudicial error.144 Some death row inmates will end up with sentences of life 
in prison. A much smaller number will be exonerated.145 Thus some of these 
inmates initially placed on death row will reenter society—at least the larger 
prison community. The claim that rehabilitation is wasted on death-sentenced 
inmates because they will never reenter society is not only morally 
questionable but often factually incorrect.146 Any death row that is retained 
should prepare its inmates for the possibility of eventual reentry into human 
community, because many of its inmates will do so.147 Thus, rehabilitation 
                                                                                                                     
without the possibility of parole. Although the VDOC’s stated reasons for separating death 
row inmates and denying them programming apply with equal force to both classes, 
inmates serving life sentences are presumptively assigned to the general population units at 
SISP, where they may avail themselves of limited programming.”). 
 142 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 79. 
 143 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16; see also Gross, O’Brien, Hu & Kennedy, 
supra note 11, at 7230–31. 
 144 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR 
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–1995, at i (June 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/ 
instructionalservices/liebman/liebman_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MZC-5JWQ]. 
 145 Since 1973, 156 persons sentenced to death have been found innocent, according to 
the Death Penalty Information Center. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/EE4J-HD5C] (including in the list of innocent persons those who were 
sentenced to death but later were acquitted of all charges related to the alleged capital 
crime, had all charges relating to the alleged capital crime dismissed by the prosecution, or 
were pardoned based on evidence of innocence). Some scholars have attempted to calculate 
the percent of inmates who are innocent, but not necessarily exonerated. See Gross, 
O’Brien, Hu & Kennedy, supra note 11, at 7230 (“The high rate of exoneration among 
death-sentenced defendants appears to be driven by the threat of execution, but most death-
sentenced defendants are removed from death row and resentenced to life imprisonment, 
after which the likelihood of exoneration drops sharply.”). 
 146 The resource conservation claim might support treating death-sentenced inmates 
harshly after all court review is completed (though under the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence they may always present a claim of actual innocence). But it offers little 
justification for the immediate and permanent denial of human interaction and privileges to 
all death-sentenced inmates. 
 147 See LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 144, at ii (recounting the high rates of 
sentencing error). 
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provides no justification for the debilitating conditions of death row that 
prevail today. 
C. Is Death Row Necessary for Retributive Justice? 
Advocates of retributive punishment might view the idea of a 
rehabilitative death row—particularly the “humane death row” that Johnson 
proposes148—as profoundly unjust. One self-professed advocate of retributive 
punishment is Robert Blecker, who contends that justice requires harsh death 
row conditions.149 According to Blecker, prevailing death row conditions are 
far too lenient.150 In his 2013 book, The Death of Punishment, Blecker 
recounts life on death row. His book focuses in particular on the lives and 
executions of inmates he interviewed in Florida and Tennessee.151 Blecker 
describes seeing death row inmates playing games and watching television.152 
He contrasts the way that the death row inmates lived with the way in which 
they made their victims suffer. In gruesome detail, Blecker recounts how one 
death row inmate in Florida, Danny Rolling, mercilessly raped, murdered, and 
gutted a young university student and killed four other students in a killing 
spree.153 He recounts how Florida death row prisoner David Keen raped an 
eight-year-old child, strangled her with a shoelace, and dumped her, still 
living, into a river.154 And he describes how Daryl Holton, an inmate confined 
on death row in Tennessee, took his unsuspecting children into his garage, 
lined them up two at a time, and shot them to death.155 To Blecker, death row 
is not nearly harsh enough in light of these prisoners’ crimes.  
Retributive justice, Blecker contends, requires punishment that far better 
fits the crime. He proposes a “model” death penalty statute in which death-
sentenced inmates live in “permanent punitive segregation”: 
Those condemned to die . . . shall be permanently housed in a separate 
prison [wing], with their daily conditions no better than prisoners already 
subject to punitive or administrative segregation for the worst prison 
infractions. Specifically, within constitutional bounds, those condemned to 
death . . . shall have only the minimum constitutionally mandated exercise, 
                                                                                                                     
 148 JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 213–14. 
 149 See BLECKER, supra note 26, at 205 (recounting his testimony to the Connecticut 
legislature that “[t]his legislature should specify that harsher punishment shall attach on 
death row”); cf. id. at 89 (“Witnessing the execution, I shuddered. It felt too much like a 
hospital or hospice where I watched my father-in-law die mercifully. How we kill those we 
condemn should in no way resemble how we kill those we love.”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See generally id. 
 152 See, e.g., id. at 130, 161. 
 153 Id. at 76–77. 
 154 Id. at 99. 
 155 BLECKER, supra note 26, at 110–11. 
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recreation, phone calls, or physical contact. They shall not be permitted any 
communal form of play. 
 
Their sole food shall be nutraloaf, nutritionally complete and tasteless. 
Photographs of their victims shall be posted in their cells, out of reach, in 
visibly conspicuous places.156 
Blecker criticizes prison officials for providing too many privileges to 
death-sentenced inmates out of a self-interested desire to make the inmates 
easier to handle and thus their own lives easier.157 From his perspective, 
lenient treatment of death-sentenced criminals tends to be unjustly generous 
and leaves “[t]he nature of the crime . . . completely severed from the 
experience of the punishment.”158 
Blecker’s depiction of current death row conditions as lenient seems 
startling and inconsistent with the representations of death row conditions as 
extraordinarily harsh presented by so many scholars and studies.159 But he 
does not appear to have focused on states where prisoners are held in solitary 
confinement or denied most human interactions. In his book, Blecker describes 
                                                                                                                     
 156 Id. at 282 (second alteration in original). Legislatures have sometimes embraced the 
idea of a limited diet as punishment. The Supreme Court’s decision in Holden v. Minnesota 
cites an 1868 statute requiring life-sentenced prisoners to be: 
[P]unished by imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison . . . with solitary 
confinement upon bread and water diet for twelve days in each year during the term, 
to be apportioned in periods of not exceeding three days’ duration each, with an 
interval of not less than fourteen days intervening each two successive periods. 
137 U.S. 483, 488 (1890). And a trial court not long ago required, as part of the sentence of 
a capital prisoner, that he have to face pictures of his victims in his cell every day. See 
Associated Press, Man Who Threw Kids off Bridge Gets Death—Judge Also Orders That 
He Be Shown Photos of Children Every Day, NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30500905/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/man-who-threw-kids-
bridge-gets-death/ [https://perma.cc/5KXT-2C83]. Later, the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals reversed the man’s conviction and ordered a new trial, but the Supreme Court of 
Alabama reversed again and remanded, and on remand the lower appellate court affirmed 
the death sentence. See Luong v. State, No. 1121097, 2014 WL 983288, at *19 (Ala. Mar. 
14, 2014), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 23, 2014); Luong v. State, No. CR-08-
1219, 2015 WL 1780094, at *50 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2015) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, No. CR-08-1219, 2015 WL 4162926 (Ala. Crim. App. July 10, 2015), and cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1494 (2016). 
 157 BLECKER, supra note 26, at 165 (citing the perspective of a warden’s assistant in 
Oklahoma: “We make it easy for them because it’s easy for us when it’s easy for them.”). 
Johnson, who demands more humane conditions on death row, seems to agree that 
appeasement is undesirable. He argues that some officers grant privileges out of fear of the 
prisoners. JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 111. 
 158 BLECKER, supra note 26, at 166. 
 159 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 6, at 8; FIDH & CCR, supra note 2, at 4; Cunningham 
& Vigen, supra note 56, at 204; Johnson & Carroll, supra note 16, at 8-3; Lombardi, 
Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56, at 3.  
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his experiences in a handful of states that do offer some privileges to death 
row inmates,160 including the opportunity to exercise with one another, which 
are not granted in many other capital punishment states.161 At least eleven 
other capital punishment states report that they do not permit death row 
inmates to engage in any congregate activities.162 Some states, including 
Arizona, hold their death-sentenced inmates in supermax confinement, as 
Lynch has described.163 Blecker might be pleased to find out that, at least in 
some states, his arguments for retributive justice are defenses of much of the 
status quo. 
Though Blecker’s demands for harsh death row conditions may seem 
extreme, retributive justifications for harsh prison conditions are not new. In 
the late eighteenth century, some critics of the penal system advocated harsher 
prison conditions in lieu of capital punishment; they urged states to seal 
prisoners away in remote locations where prisoners would be forced to 
meditate on their offenses without any visitors.164 Blecker simply wants some 
murderers to get both punishments—harsh conditions and death as well.165  
Blecker offers a particularly harsh vision of death row; other retributive 
justice advocates might desire death row to be harsh, but not quite so severe, 
perhaps seeking to combine the purposes of retributive justice with those of 
rehabilitation. Stephanos Bibas has advocated involving inmates in restorative 
justice, to repair some of the harm done by their crimes, but at the same time 
he has criticized other advocates of restorative justice who would “sweep 
away the traditional goals and processes of criminal justice” and who view 
“retribution for retribution’s sake [as] pointless.”166 He has written: 
                                                                                                                     
 160 See, e.g., ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 19, 23 (indicating that 
death-sentenced inmates may exercise with one another in Florida and Tennessee); 
BLECKER, supra note 26, at 78 (describing how death row inmates are permitted to play 
basketball with one another in Florida); id. at 162 (mentioning his experiences with death 
rows in Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee). Blecker describes seeing Oklahoma 
condemned prisoners playing basketball together. That seems inconsistent with prison 
officials’ claims in the ASCA Housing Policy Survey. See ASCA HOUSING POLICY 
SURVEY, supra note 14, at 14, 22 (stating that Oklahoma inmates sentenced to death are not 
permitted to participate in congregate activities and are not allowed movement even within 
the death row unit unless in restraints). Perhaps Oklahoma’s policy has changed, or 
perhaps it was not being enforced during Blecker’s visit. 
 161 ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 9–32. 
 162 Id. at 9–16. 
 163 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 66. 
 164 BANNER, supra note 35, at 109. 
 165 Blecker would eliminate some standard aggravators, including felony murder and 
premeditation, thus excluding a number of murderers eligible under current capital 
punishment statutes in the United States. See BLECKER, supra note 26, at 279. 
 166 Stephanos Bibas, Restoration, but Also More Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 595, 596 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan eds., 2009). 
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[P]unishment is supposed to hurt. The bite of punishment sends an 
unequivocal message condemning the wrongdoer and vindicating the victim. 
It pays the criminal’s debt to society. It teaches criminals and others not to 
hurt others, humbling proud wrongdoers. Restitution and fines can 
supplement prison and perhaps reduce the need for it. But because they lack 
the bite of condemnation and pain, they send too soft a message, overlooking 
the wrong and trying to hurry by it too fast. Criminals need to atone, to be 
humbled, to suffer. If they do not, the criminal does not learn a lesson and 
victims and the public never see justice done, leaving them dissatisfied.167 
If states viewed harsh death row conditions as just retribution, they 
nonetheless might limit the prisoners’ isolation to encourage restoration and 
reconciliation. States might permit death row inmates, for example, to meet 
with the families of their victims to express remorse (something not 
contemplated under many current visitation policies). Or states might permit 
death row inmates to join in work programs only if they agreed to have their 
compensation sent to the families of their victims. In other words, a retributive 
vision of death row need not reflect the monolithic harshness of the permanent 
punitive segregation that Blecker proposes. 
Retributive theory surfaces in other academic and judicial discourse about 
death row conditions.168 Even when speaking of security rationales for death 
row conditions, courts sometimes advert to the moral desert of capital inmates. 
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has written: 
Justice [John Paul] Stevens criticizes the “dehumanizing effects” of the 
manner in which [the death row prisoner] has been confined, but he never 
pauses to consider whether there is a legitimate penological reason for 
keeping certain inmates in restrictive confinement. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Justice Stevens altogether refuses to take into consideration the 
gruesome nature of the crimes that legitimately lead States to authorize the 
death penalty and juries to impose it. . . .  
 
                                                                                                                     
 167 Id. 
 168 See, e.g., Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1966) (justifying death 
row conditions as acceptable by noting that “a death row inmate, is [not] entitled to the 
same privileges as the ordinary prisoner” (emphasis added)). Such acknowledgement of 
potential retributive purposes for death row may reflect that most people view capital 
punishment itself as justified on retributive principles. See BOHM, supra note 10, at 303 
(recounting a 2008 public opinion survey in which 54.6% of respondents chose retribution 
as the main reason for supporting capital punishment). 
2016] DOES THE DEATH PENALTY REQUIRE DEATH ROW? 561 
. . . It is the crime—and not the punishment imposed by the jury or the 
delay in petitioner’s execution—that was “unacceptably cruel.”169 
Like Blecker, Justice Thomas invokes the death row inmate’s capital 
crime in his evaluation of the justice of harsh death row conditions. In a recent 
case, he responded to concerns that a death-sentenced prisoner had been held 
for decades in solitary confinement by noting that the prisoner’s 
“accommodations . . . are a far sight more spacious than those in which his 
victims . . . now rest.”170 The idea that retributive justice supports harsh death 
row conditions has appeared in lower court decisions as well, such as an 
opinion regarding death row in Pennsylvania in which the Third Circuit stated: 
“[W]e cannot conclude that the totality of the conditions on Pennsylvania’s 
death rows constitute punishment ‘grossly disproportionate to the severity of 
the crime[s].’”171 
But not all would agree that retribution justifies harsh confinement on 
death row. Russell Christopher contends that substantial death row 
incarceration may render the full experience of punishment retributively 
excessive.172 If one defends the death penalty on retribution grounds, he 
argues, one sees the death penalty as proportional to at least some capital 
crimes.173 Death row incarceration then adds punishment and renders the 
death penalty disproportionately harsh under a retributive calculus.174 
                                                                                                                     
 169 Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1118–19 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted); see also id. at 1115 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“As 
he awaits execution, petitioner has endured especially severe conditions of confinement, 
spending up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell. Two death warrants have 
been signed against him and stayed only shortly before he was scheduled to be put to 
death. The dehumanizing effects of such treatment are undeniable.”). 
 170 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 171 Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
 172 Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
421, 483 (2014) (“[When c]onstruing substantial death row incarceration as additional 
punishment . . . the combination of it and death by execution is disproportional, undeserved 
and unjustified.”). 
 173 Id. at 463. 
 174 Christopher argues that if, in the alternative, death row is viewed as mitigation of 
the penalty of death (through continued life), then it is retributively too weak. Id. Again 
alternatively, if death row is viewed as “nothing”—neither punishment nor mitigation of 
punishment—then it leads to an “absurdity” because then persons who die of natural causes 
on death row receive “no punishment at all.” Id. at 469–71. Neither of these arguments 
seems persuasive. If death row mitigates punishment, this result may be accepted because 
justice requires greater concern for avoiding excessive punishment—through lengthy 
judicial review designed to determine whether prisoners have been sentenced in error—
than with avoiding improper mitigation of punishment. And the fact that some prisoners 
will die of natural causes on death row does not illuminate an “absurd” result but merely 
shows that retributive justice is sometimes impossible. It is similarly impossible to achieve 
full justice when a prisoner sentenced to fifty years in prison dies in prison after two years 
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But Christopher’s argument that death row incarceration is inconsistent 
with retributive justice appears to assume that execution is the maximum 
punishment a retributivist would consider appropriate for capital murder. That 
seems far from clear, at least for some of the most egregious capital murders 
such as the ones that Blecker describes.175 If some capital crimes—and only 
some—are severe enough to justify harsh death row conditions as well as 
execution, such additional punishment could be limited to offenders who have 
committed very aggravated capital murders (based on jury findings of specific 
aggravation). Limiting harsh death row conditions in this manner might be a 
way to calibrate retributive punishment to fit a range of capital crimes. 
Retributive justifications for harsh death row conditions would still raise a 
significant concern, however. The problem lies in the extraordinarily high 
rates of capital sentencing error. As mentioned above, yearly capital 
punishment statistics provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics show that 
over forty percent of inmates sentenced to death have been removed from 
death row.176 For inmates who are exonerated or resentenced to life or to a 
lesser term, the additional suffering caused by harsh death row conditions 
would be unjust.177 
The problem of unjust suffering by persons improperly sent to death row 
might be reduced by selective abolition of capital punishment for crimes that 
do not involve the highest degree of culpability (eliminating felony murder, for 
example, as even Blecker would do) or by allowing death sentences only if a 
jury has found several aggravating factors. One study of sentencing error 
revealed that for each additional aggravating factor found by a jury, the 
likelihood that the capital sentence would be reversed decreased by fifteen 
percent.178 If this measure is correct, then sentencing error could be reduced if 
prosecutors proved to a capital jury a higher number of aggravating factors 
                                                                                                                     
or when a prisoner sentenced to prison escapes before he can be confined. These events 
simply do not call into question the retributive justice of the penalty imposed by law. 
 175 See BLECKER, supra note 26, at 76–77, 99, 110–11. Moreover, there is a larger 
retributive problem in imposing the same capital penalty for a wide range of offenses, from 
felony murder (where even Blecker agrees it punishes too much) to premeditated first-
degree murder. The Supreme Court held capital punishment for felony murder 
constitutional in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
 176 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16; see also Gross, O’Brien, Hu & Kennedy, 
supra note 11, at 7230. 
 177 This problem of unjust suffering exists in other cases of sentencing error, but 
statistics suggest that capital sentencing error is particularly high. See infra note 193 and 
accompanying text.  
The potential retributive problem with harsh death row conditions raised by capital 
sentencing error might not arise for prisoners removed from death row for reasons such as 
mercy-based commutations or lack of resources to retry defendants who receive appellate 
or habeas relief. 
 178 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN, ANDREW GELMAN, VALERIE WEST, GARTH 
DAVIES & ALEXANDER KISS, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR 
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 333–34 (Feb. 2002), 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/26AC-43AM]. 
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(and no longer pursued the death penalty if the jury found only a low number 
of aggravating factors).  
Perhaps another way to reduce the potential injustice of harsh death row 
conditions would be to impose them only after a death sentence has been 
upheld on state appellate and collateral review. According to the study by 
Liebman, Fagan, and West, most sentencing error is discovered during state 
court review.179 The risk of unjust punishment through harsh death row 
conditions thus could be mitigated by waiting until the end of state court 
review to send death-sentenced inmates to death row. But because the federal 
courts also find sentencing error,180 further mitigation of the problem of 
unjustly harsh death row conditions would require states to wait until both 
state and federal courts complete their review. Then, though later investigation 
still might find evidence of actual innocence, the risk of unjust placement on 
death row would be low. 
Unless some such solution can be found, however, the high incidence of 
capital sentencing error presents a profound challenge to the justice of harsh 
death row conditions imposed on retributive grounds. Retributive theory thus 
continues to provide arguments not only for and against the death penalty181 
but also for and against death row. 
D. Is Death Row Necessary to Deter Others from Crime?182 
Those who do not believe that retributive justice by itself requires harsh 
death row conditions nonetheless might find that general deterrence 
necessitates such conditions (within the bounds permitted by just 
 
                                                                                                                     
 179 LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 144, at i. 
 180 See id.; see also NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL 
TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND 
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 10 (Aug. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ2A-Q544]. 
 181 Public opinion suggests strong support for the death penalty as such in terms of 
retributive justice. See Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-
Penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/A8KR-P59W] [hereinafter GALLUP Death Penalty]. This 
view also reflects the state of the law, but not the opinion of this author. 
 182 Death row arguably also might serve a specific deterrence purpose, but not if death 
row confinement is permanent, as it is today. See supra note 115. Using death row for 
specific deterrence (to discourage the death row inmate from killing again) differs from 
using death row for purposes of incapacitation (to prevent the inmate from such violence, 
see supra Part III.A). 
To be specifically deterred by the harshness of death row conditions, the prisoner 
would have to be removed from death row so as to fear being returned there. Perhaps 
specific deterrence could be achieved by placing all death-sentenced prisoners on death 
row for an initial period of time and subsequently only if they kill again. This arrangement 
would give them firsthand experience of the hardship of death row and a likely desire to 
avoid it. 
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retribution183). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that states may 
impose harsh death row conditions for a deterrent as well as retributive 
purpose. In 1890, the Supreme Court described a law requiring solitary 
confinement of death-sentenced inmates as imposing “an additional 
punishment of the most important and painful character” that was designed “to 
mark [the prisoners] as examples of the just punishment of the worst crimes of 
the human race.”184 
To be sure, deterrence may no longer motivate strongly most proponents 
of capital punishment and might not influence their approach to death row. 
The latest Gallup poll showed that only six percent of Americans stated that 
they supported the death penalty on deterrence grounds, when supporters were 
given a list of grounds from which to choose.185 The poll also showed that 
roughly half as many people today believe the death penalty deters as people 
did in 1985.186 Some research suggests that the death penalty in fact does not 
deter,187 but these findings are controverted by other studies.188 
                                                                                                                     
Such temporary harsh confinement would be very different from death row today, which is 
permanent. Its potential benefits seem limited. Much of the deterrence effect of temporary 
death row confinement might be achieved through the threat of disciplinary segregation, 
which prisoners routinely face. Moreover, temporary death row presents the same 
overbreadth problem as permanent death row, see supra Part III.A (citing evidence that not 
all death-sentenced prisoners require heightened security), though the unnecessary harm 
would be imposed for a shorter duration. 
 183 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 22 (1998) (“One widely shared understanding is that 
even if deterrence of crime is the general aim of a system of criminal prohibitions, ‘just 
desert’ (or retribution) should be a limit on the distribution of punishment.”). 
 184 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 169–71 (1890) (emphasis added); cf. Coleman v. 
Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that “the deterrent 
value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the 
consequences of the ultimate step itself”). 
 185 See GALLUP Death Penalty, supra note 181. Most respondents apparently chose 
only one ground, although the choice of more than one was not forbidden. See id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See, e.g., John J. Donahue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death 
Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249, 249 (2009) (noting that “[t]here is little 
clarity about the knowledge potential murderers have concerning the risk of execution,” 
such as whether they tend to be aware of the passage or the existence of a death penalty 
statute). Robert Bohm offers an elegant summary of some of the assumptions and problems 
of the deterrence rationale for capital punishment. See BOHM, supra note 10, at 164–65. He 
also outlines studies that have suggested a counter-deterrent, or “brutalizing,” effect that if 
true would mean that capital punishment increases the likelihood of murders. See id. at 
166–67. 
 188 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining 
that “[i]t seems very likely” that the death penalty has a significant deterrent effect, and 
citing “statistical studies that say so”). The interesting analysis of one empirical scholar 
suggests that in some states, executions deter, whereas in other states, executions may 
actually lead to higher rates of murder. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus 
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Perhaps deterrence rationales no longer influence many death penalty 
supporters because so few persons who commit capital crimes are actually 
executed.189 But even if execution is improbable,190 the de facto punishment 
of death row is not.191 Making life on death row much worse than life in the 
general prison population might help deter others from capital crime. 
Predicting a deterrent effect is difficult, and depends on evidence about 
whether potential criminals know what crimes carry the death penalty and 
whether they will weigh rationally the costs and benefits.192 But it seems at 
least plausible to think that harsh prison conditions might have some marginal 
deterrent effect. 
Whether achieving such marginal deterrence would justify imposing harsh 
death row conditions on all death-sentenced prisoners raises a different 
question and a potential problem. Reversal rates in capital cases are 
exceptionally high.193 For those prisoners sentenced to death in error, death 
row incarceration augments their improperly imposed punishment. Deterrence 
objectives thus may bolster the argument for harsh death row conditions, but 
only if one accepts, as a normative matter, the risk of unjust additional harm to 
prisoners improperly sentenced to death. 
 * * * 
The foregoing discussion of punishment purposes for death row reveals 
that retaining death row requires normative choices. The administrative 
rationale for death row, grounded in claims that death-sentenced inmates are 
                                                                                                                     
Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
203, 205 (2005). 
 189 See supra note 11 (recounting evidence that few inmates are executed). 
 190 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting only a 
“remote possibility of death” for prisoners sentenced to death in California (emphasis 
omitted)), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 191 Liebman, Fagan, and West’s study showed that most death sentences are 
overturned, though not always quickly. Indeed, their study showed that after state courts 
had completed their layers of review, federal courts went on to find prejudicial error in 
over 40% of the remaining death sentences. See LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 144, 
at i (noting that state courts found prejudicial error in 47% of death sentences, while later 
federal review found such error in 40% of the remaining sentences); see also supra note 
144 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., BOHM, supra note 10, at 164–65; Donahue & Wolfers, supra note 187, at 
262–64. 
 193 The rates at which habeas corpus petitions are granted offers a useful comparison. 
See KING, CHEESMAN & OSTROM, supra note 180, at 10 (recounting that the rate at which 
petitions are granted in capital cases is thirty-five times higher than the rate in noncapital 
cases). The reasons for this error are unclear. Perhaps, when the crimes at issue are 
especially heinous and the death penalty is pursued, public outcry and the calls of the 
victims’ families may lead the jury and judge to push aside doubts to find someone to 
blame. Another reason might be that reviewing courts scrutinize more closely possible 
errors that might lead to the irreversible consequence of execution. 
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categorically more dangerous, has been undercut by empirical studies, 
particularly the study of Missouri’s abolition of death row. Retaining death 
row is not a necessity for security reasons. The fact that some death-sentenced 
prisoners are exceptionally dangerous does not require that all death-sentenced 
prisoners endure the harshness of permanent isolation. Missouri’s experience 
has shown that individual assessments can be used to determine the 
appropriate custody level for death-sentenced prisoners, as is done with other, 
noncapital prisoners. 
Death row still might be seen to serve other punishment purposes, 
however. Retribution and deterrence aims offer potential reasons to retain 
harsh death row conditions,194 and perhaps to make them more severe. Some 
advocates of harsh punishment might favor punitive death row conditions, as 
Robert Blecker does.195 Others might believe that capital offenders deserve 
less harsh conditions than Blecker proposes, but still harsher conditions than 
noncapital prisoners experience. Still others might believe that juries should be 
authorized to decide whether certain particularly heinous murderers deserve 
the additional punishment of death row—serial killers, perhaps, but not felony 
murderers. 
Ultimately, the decision whether to retain death row requires judgments 
about the purposes of punishment and how much potentially undeserved 
suffering society should inflict in the interest of punishment objectives. The 
next Part of this Article will contend that these normative judgments should be 
made by legislatures rather than prison administrators. 
IV. RE-ALLOCATING DECISIONAL POWER OVER DEATH ROW 
An increasing body of evidence has undercut the dangerousness rationale 
for death row and revealed that many if not most death-sentenced inmates do 
not require such strict confinement. A dangerousness rationale is no longer 
sufficient to justify augmenting punishment in such a categorical, severe, and 
permanent way. Thus retaining death row today requires an additional 
judgment that confining death-sentenced prisoners more harshly than other 
prisoners serves a valid retributive or deterrent purpose. 
This Part will show that only legislatures, not prison administrators, are 
competent to make that judgment. For legislatures alone have the power to 
prescribe punishment for crimes in a way that has democratic legitimacy, 
adheres to the constitutional separation of powers, and satisfies the principle of 
legality. And legislatures ought not to delegate that power to prison 
administrators, even if a delegation were permitted, because prison 
administrators might retain death row for illegitimate psychological reasons. 
                                                                                                                     
 194 As described above, rehabilitation offers little or no basis for isolation of death-
sentenced prisoners for years and decades, as is common practice today. See supra Part 
III.B. 
 195 See supra notes 149–158 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Legislative Responsibility for Just Punishment 
The preceding Part revealed why only punishment purposes of retribution 
or deterrence can justify death row. Both of these aims, this Part now will 
explain, may be chosen only by the legislature. 
1. Retributive and Deterrent Rationales 
If death row is to be retained for purposes of retribution—either for all 
capital offenders or for some—a legislative choice is needed to authorize that 
additional punishment. Retributive justifications for punishment are evaluated 
more properly by the legislature than by prison administrators, for they entail 
questions of proportionality and desert that do not admit of empirically correct 
or provable answers—choices about how wrong an action is and how much 
suffering a human being should be forced to endure. The decision whether to 
treat death-sentenced inmates categorically more harshly than other inmates is 
a moral choice more rightly made by the political body most tied to the people 
whose normative judgments are embodied in the criminal law.196 
Without a legislative decision, it would be inappropriate for sentencing 
authorities, as well as for prison administrators, to impose death row based on 
notions of desert. To prescribe death row for punitive reasons without prior 
statutory authorization would violate the principle of legality and its 
instantiations in the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses.197 
A deterrence rationale for death row likewise requires legislative approval. 
In part, that is because punishment for deterrence reasons may be understood 
to require an initial determination that such punishment is deserved, or 
retributively just.198 Legislatures must make that determination. Furthermore, 
with regard to the empirical question of which punishments effectively deter, 
legislatures remain the proper decision-makers, at least as compared to certain 
other institutional actors. The Supreme Court has stated that, 
                                                                                                                     
 196 Similar arguments have been made in favor of political answers to, inter alia, the 
immigration question. See Andrés Snaider, The Politics and Tension in Delegating Plenary 
Power: The Need To Revive Nondelegation Principles in the Field of Immigration, 6 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 107, 125–26 (1992). 
 197 The principle of notice can be seen as an aspect of the broader “principle of 
legality” that grounds American and European criminal law. See infra notes 209–213 and 
accompanying text. Note that an administrative imposition of punishment might not violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause if courts were to construe the administratively imposed sanction 
not to constitute a “law.” It would be troubling, however, for legislatures to be able to 
evade the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws through delegations of 
punishment authority to administrative actors. And legislatures should not be allowed to 
evade notice or legality principles through vaguely worded or merely implicit delegations 
of authority to administrators to impose punishments—such as those that now grant prison 
administrators decisional power over death row. 
 198 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 183, at 22. 
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The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex 
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, 
which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the 
courts.199 
Though the Supreme Court then was comparing legislative competence 
with judicial competence regarding the deterrence question, its explanation 
bolsters the argument for legislative choice insofar as it points to multi-party 
legislative hearing and debate mechanisms as best suited to deal with a 
“complex factual issue.”200 
Various schools of thought support reliance on the legislature for such 
disputed normative decisions. Legal process theorists have defended the 
efficacy and propriety of legislative determinations. Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks described the legislative process as the “forge and anvil of major public 
policy,” noting that some problems “have to come [to the legislature] because 
they cut so deep into the vital concerns of people that no other official agency 
has the toughness and resiliency to hammer out solutions which will command 
acceptance.”201 Jeremy Waldron has presented an argument for legislative 
decision-making derived from Aristotelian theory and centered on the 
“doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude.”202 Waldron describes the doctrine 
in its weak form as follows: “The people acting as a body are capable of 
making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight, 
than any individual member of the body, however excellent, is capable of 
making on his own.”203 He then states the claim in its strong form: “The 
people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling 
their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any subset of the people acting 
as a body and pooling the knowledge, experience, and insight of the members 
of the subset.”204 These theories help explain why a legislative decision is so 
important and appropriate in the death row context, where the choice involves 
unsettled (and highly controversial) normative and empirical claims about the 
purposes and effects of punishment. 
In some states, the law simply may not allow death row without express 
statutory authorization. Numerous state courts have ruled that “the power to 
create crimes and punishments . . . inheres solely in the democratic processes 
                                                                                                                     
 199 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976). 
 200 Id.; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 700 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
 201 Id. Hart and Sacks also noted “the durability of public policies and principles of 
social action which have been developed by the process of full-fledged, hard-fought 
legislative and public debate.” Id. at 701. 
 202 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 93 (1999). 
 203 Id. at 93–94. 
 204 Id. at 94. 
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of the legislative branch.”205 Some have explained that the “authority to define 
crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in the legislature, 
and it may not delegate that power either expressly or by implication.”206 
The legislature’s monopoly on the power to prescribe punishment reflects 
a principle undergirding the legal system—“the principle nulla poena sine lege 
                                                                                                                     
 205 Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991) (citing Borges v. State, 415 So. 
2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982)) (stating that “the power to create crimes and punishments in 
derogation of the common law inheres solely in the democratic processes of the legislative 
branch”); see also People v. Mikhail, 13 Cal. App. 4th 846, 854 (1993) (“[T]he legislative 
branch bears the sole responsibility and power to define criminal charges and to prescribe 
punishment . . . .”); State v. Sequeira, 995 P.2d 335, 337 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) (“[A] court 
may only pronounce a sentence ‘which the law hath annexed to the crime[,]’ and ‘a 
sentence which does not conform to statutory sentencing provisions, either in the character 
or the extent of the punishment imposed, is void.’” (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (first quoting Territory v. Armstrong, 22 Haw. 526, 535 (1915), which in turn 
quotes Blackstone; and then quoting 21A AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 825, at 88 (2d ed. 
1998))); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781 (Miss. 1974) (“We hold that the authority to 
define crimes and fix the punishment . . . is vested exclusively in the legislature . . . .”); 
Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Neb. 1960) (“The public . . . may 
properly assume that crimes and punishment are purely a legislative function and that the 
definition of all crimes and the punishment therefor will be found in the duly enacted 
statutes of this state.”); State v. Krego, 433 N.E.2d 1298, 1299 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1981) 
(“[T]he authority to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in 
the legislature . . . .”). 
Deborah Denno has written on impermissible delegation of punishment power in the 
capital punishment context, focusing on whether legislatures improperly delegate the 
choice of method of execution. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate 
Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection 
and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 100 (2002) (“Of particular interest in this 
article are challenges concerning the extent to which a state can delegate to prison 
personnel the discretion and power to punish, a problem of greater relevance in lethal 
injection cases.”); id. at 66 (“Legislatures delegate death to prison personnel and 
executioners who are not qualified to devise a lethal injection protocol, much less carry one 
out. . . . In their all-consuming haste to perpetuate the death penalty, legislatures and courts 
promote an uncontrolled brutality that should have no place in society or the law.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 206 Krego, 433 N.E.2d at 1299; Howell, 300 So. 2d at 781 (same); Lincoln Dairy Co., 
104 N.W.2d at 232 (“The Legislature may not avoid by delegation the performance of its 
exclusive function to define crimes and provide the punishment therefor.”). State court 
decisions differ, however, on the degree of separation required among the branches. Some 
have ruled, for example, that the legislature may leave certain decisions regarding the way 
punishment is imposed to the executive branch. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reed v. Howard, 69 
N.E.2d 172, 172 (Ind. 1946) (“The place of punishment of convicts is within the control of 
the legislature designation of which it may delegate to other agencies.”); Ex parte Granviel, 
561 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (allowing the legislature to 
delegate to the Director of the Department of Corrections the “power to determine details 
so as to carry out the legislative purpose which the Legislature cannot practically or 
efficiently perform itself”). These decisions do not suggest that the legislature may delegate 
power to increase punishment. 
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[no punishment without a prior statutory prohibition].”207 Herbert Packer 
described the principle of prior definition of crime and punishment as one that 
has been treated as “[t]he first principle” of American criminal law.208 Under 
this principle of legality, “the legislature is the principal lawmaker in a modern 
system of criminal law.”209 
This principle of legality has led courts to prevent prosecution and 
punishment from extending beyond the clear reach of statutory authorizations 
through the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the doctrine requiring strict 
construction of penal statutes (the rule of lenity).210 The prohibition against ex 
post facto lawmaking embodies the same idea.211 According to the Supreme 
Court, “[t]he fair warning requirement . . . reflects the deference due to the 
legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and their 
punishment.”212 Furthermore, the Court has explained: 
                                                                                                                     
 207 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1998) (alteration in 
original). 
 208 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79–80 (1968) (“The 
first principle [of the criminal law], we are repeatedly told, is that conduct may not be 
treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an authority having the institutional 
competence to do so before it has taken place.”); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. 
GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 92 (6th ed. 2012) (“The American 
legal system espouses the principle nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, or ‘no 
crime without law, no punishment without law.’ . . . There are three interrelated 
corollaries . . . . First, criminal statutes should be understandable . . . . Second, criminal 
statutes should be crafted so that they do not ‘delegate[] basic policy matters to policemen, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ Third, judicial 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes should ‘be biased in favor of the accused,’ a concept 
that has come to be known as the lenity doctrine.” (fourth alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972))). 
 209 PACKER, supra note 208, at 91–92. Because this Article focuses on statutory 
authorization of death row and administrative imposition of death row, it does not address 
whether the principle of legality is offended by common law crimes and punishments. 
Some might argue that it does. George Fletcher, for example, contends that the Model 
Penal Code’s acceptance of punishment for omissions based on common law duties to act 
“raises serious problems under the principle [of legality].” FLETCHER, supra note 207, at 
47–48. But whether the principle of legality has been modified in the United States to 
allow for punishment based on common law as well as statute is not relevant to the analysis 
here, where death row is established either by statute or administrative rule. 
 210 PACKER, supra note 208, at 93. In some jurisdictions, the principle of legality is 
codified. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Lucret Quiñones, 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 904, 931 n.79 (P.R. 
1981) (“The principle of legality provides that ‘ . . . no punishments or security measures 
shall be imposed if not previously established [by law]’ [and] ‘[n]o crimes, penalties or 
security measures may be created by analogy.’” (last alteration in original) (quoting P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3031)).  
 211 PACKER, supra note 208, at 80. 
 212 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997) (emphasis added) (first citing 
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); then citing United States v. 
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995); then citing PACKER, supra note 208, at 79–96; and then 
citing John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985)). 
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The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is . . . founded on the 
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle 
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
department. It is the legislature . . . which is to define a crime, and ordain its 
punishment.213 
Allowing prison administrators to augment punishment outside the public 
lawmaking process could contravene the principle of legality, especially when 
the administrative rule-making process fails to give public notice of the 
punishment to be imposed. That is the case in those states in which prison 
policies need not be issued after public notice and comment or published 
publicly. In Virginia, for example, at least one of the prison regulations 
governing death row confinement is not available to the public on the 
Department of Corrections regulations website; when death row in Virginia 
was challenged in litigation, the relevant policy was filed under seal.214 
Punishment imposed by such hidden means does not satisfy the principle of 
legality and constitutional requirements of fair and public notice. 
For these reasons, death row may not be retained for punishment reasons 
without an express determination by legislatures that such confinement is 
appropriate. 
2. Defending Legislative Action Against Objections 
Two core objections may be made to this call for legislative action. One 
lies in an institutional concern regarding the micromanagement of prisons, and 
the other lies in a consequentialist fear that legislatures will make death row 
even more cruel. But neither of these concerns provides a sufficient 
justification for ceding to prison administrators the choice of whether to 
establish death row. 
a. Prison Micromanagement 
The first objection to legislative intervention regarding death row likely 
will be that legislatures should not become enmeshed in matters of internal 
prison discipline.215 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “a prison’s internal 
                                                                                                                     
 213 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95. 
 214 See E-mail from Michael Bern, supra note 72. 
 215 The Supreme Court has required deference to prison officials regarding internal 
discipline: 
“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption 
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” . . . It does not 
insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it 
requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials 
who have made a considered choice.  
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security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison 
administrators.”216 Prison administrators, not courts or legislators, have 
institutional expertise with regard to inmate discipline and institutional 
concerns. Yet if legislatures alone possess authority to establish death row 
because it is based only on the sentence imposed, it might appear that 
legislatures must review all other prison decisions that involve sentencing 
considerations. In some jurisdictions, for example, prison administrators 
assign initial custody levels based on expected years in prison, as well as other 
factors.217 If death row is seen to augment punishment, arguably these 
decisions, too, would need to be reviewed. This objection would reflect a 
legitimate reluctance to intrude upon prison decisions that can be based on 
administrators’ experience and expertise. 
However, legislatures already do make decisions regarding prison policy. 
The Virginia legislature, for example, has required prison administrators to 
give prisoners “appropriate program assignments including career and 
technical education, work activities and employment, academic activities . . . , 
counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, and such related activities 
as may be necessary to assist prisoners in the successful transition to free 
society and gainful employment.”218 The legislature has specified the average 
number of program hours each prisoner should receive, with the number 
increasing a specified amount over a period of several years.219 A statute 
stating whether death row is appropriate would not require more interference. 
Death row placement differs in important ways, moreover, from other 
decisions made by prison administrators. Three features typically set death 
row apart. First, death row is categorical. The entire class of death-sentenced 
prisoners is segregated and isolated. Other prisoners, in contrast, typically 
receive individual evaluations to determine their custody placement, either 
upon entry into prison or periodically thereafter.220 This purely sentenced-
                                                                                                                     
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986) (first alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). 
 216 Id. at 321 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 337, 349 n.14 (1981)). 
 217 See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 
NO. P5100.08, at ch. 5, p. 5 (2006), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3NGT-8RP4] (providing general rules for security designations based, 
inter alia, on remaining sentence length, but permitting deviations to lesser security based 
on other circumstances, such as “positive adjustment” to prison life); VA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
INSTITUTIONS BY SECURITY LEVELS, http://vadoc.virginia.gov/facilities/security-levels.shtm 
[https://perma.cc/PGA6-DWQP] (indicating that prisoners’ sentences affect their security 
and location assignments but that prisoners who do not engage in disruptive behavior may 
be eligible for transfers to less secure facilities). 
 218 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-32.1(A) (2013). 
 219 See id. § 53.1-32.1(C)(1)–(5). 
 220 Research for this Article has unearthed no exception to this rule. Even where prison 
policies take sentences into account in determining custody placements, placements may be 
overridden based on other considerations and are subject to reassessment in light of 
institutional behavior. See, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., OFFENDER ORIENTATION 
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based aspect of death row gives it its presumptively punitive character. 
Second, death row is permanent. Death-sentenced prisoners remain on death 
row until they die or are found to have been sentenced in error; other 
prisoners, in contrast, may request and receive custody transfers based on good 
behavior.221 The permanence of death row indicates that prison administrators 
are not establishing death row based on expert decisions that reflect their 
unique view into prisoners’ behavior and administrative needs. And third, 
death row is severely harsh. The severity of death row conditions makes them 
significant and of urgent concern.222 In many states death row means solitary 
confinement, perhaps the harshest prison condition possible, and far worse 
than normal maximum security conditions.223 Solitary confinement otherwise 
                                                                                                                     
HANDBOOK 5 (2015), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Offender_Orientation_ 
Handbook_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TSE-76WU] (“An offender’s custody level 
depends on his current institutional behavior, his previous institutional behavior, and his 
current offense and sentence length. If the offender violates any rules, he may be placed in 
a more restrictive custody. If the offender complies with the rules, he may be assigned a 
less restrictive custody level.”); VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 830.5(III) 
(2014), http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/830-5.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G73G-SNU8] (providing for an annual review of each offender’s classification 
based on “an offender’s needs and objectives” and permitting general population 
offenders—but not death row inmates—to request facility transfer). 
Death row prisoners automatically face some of the strictest forms of incarceration, 
without the individualized procedural review other prisoners receive. Arkansas’s practice 
of confining death-sentenced prisoners in supermax provides an example. Noncapital 
prisoners may not be sent to Arkansas’s supermax unit unless they have escaped from a 
prior facility, assaulted another inmate or staff, been convicted of violent felony in prison, 
or for “[o]ther reasons, which the Warden believes may constitute a serious threat to the 
security and good order of the institution.” ARK. DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK 34 
(2012), http://adc.arkansas.gov/resources/Documents/Inmate%20Handbook%202012%20-
%20single%20page.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZV6-V9Q4]. To be transferred, moreover, an 
Arkansas prisoner first must receive a hearing and opportunity to call witnesses and 
introduce evidence to challenge the grounds for transfer. Id. Death-sentenced prisoners, in 
contrast, receive no such protections. Since 2003, they have been placed directly in the 
supermax facility. See Associated Press, Death Row on the Move, KAIT8 (Aug. 26, 2003), 
http://www.kait8.com/Global/story.asp?S=1417128 [https://perma.cc/W2LN-FKYR]. They 
must live in supermax confinement although, according to the prison system’s 
spokeswoman, “[t]he death row inmates are the best behaved inmates in prison.” Death-
Row Cells Are Unlocked by Accident, supra note 96 (quoting Dina Tyler, spokeswoman for 
the Arkansas prison system). 
 221 See supra note 220. 
 222 Recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the solitary confinement of 
prisoners, precisely because of the significant harms that follow from such treatment. See 
supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 223 As an example, consider the contrast between Virginia’s solitary confinement of 
death row prisoners, see supra note 4, and the conditions of general population prisoners at 
the same maximum security facility (Sussex I State Prison). The district court explained in 
Prieto v. Clarke: 
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is reserved as a temporary measure to punish inmates who violate prison rules, 
are found individually to pose special risks, or sometimes as an extreme and 
unfortunate measure deemed necessary to protect prisoners at special risk.224 
In combination, the categorical nature, permanence, and severity of death row 
conditions set them apart from all or nearly all other prison conditions. The 
need for legislative review of death row does not imply a need for legislatures 
to micromanage the many prison conditions that do not implicate these three 
crucial factors. 
A final consideration also favors legislative action: Without legislative 
action, a real risk arises that no one will make a reasoned and deliberate 
decision about whether death row is necessary. Though prison administrators 
actually are choosing to establish death row, they—like so many courts and 
scholars—may assume that death row is an inevitable consequence of the 
decision of sentencing authorities to impose the death penalty. Meanwhile, 
sentencing authorities may assume that prison administrators are maintaining 
death row based on their institutional expertise and an empirical evaluation of 
prisoner risks. Legislatures, too, may make this assumption. But in reality, no 
one is making a reasoned or deliberate decision about the need for death row. 
Justice Kennedy recently expressed a similar concern. He wrote in a 
concurring opinion in a recent capital case: “It seems fair to suggest that, in 
decades past, the public may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged 
in a careful assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges 
assumed these matters were for the policymakers and correctional experts.”225 
He urged close scrutiny over whether the solitary confinement of death-
                                                                                                                     
Conditions for [general population prisoners and death row prisoners] differ in almost 
every meaningful respect. First, general population inmates spend substantial time 
every day out of the confines of their cells. For example, they are given approximately 
80 minutes of outdoor recreation four or five days per week, and they have access to 
the open prison yard, complete with a jogging track and basketball courts. Second, 
general population inmates enjoy the near-constant company of others. . . . This is to 
say nothing of the benefits of two communal meals per day, regular contact visits 
from family and friends, and group religious and educational programming. In other 
words, the experience for general population inmates at SISP is hardly a solitary one. 
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (citation omitted), 
rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 224 See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 861.1(V)(A)(100) (2016), 
http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/861-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
AKE2-K9SY] (listing prison offenses, including killing another inmate, and providing a 
maximum penalty of loss of 30 days good conduct allowance and up to 30 days 
disciplinary segregation); VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 861.3(IX)(A)(1) 
(2015), http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/861-3.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/H32T-FCK6] (providing for segregation for personal protection or custodial 
management). 
 225 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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sentenced prisoners and other inmates was necessary, and seemed to invite a 
constitutional challenge to the long-term use of solitary confinement.226  
Requiring legislative authorization of death row will ensure that it is not 
used illegitimately and unthinkingly to augment the punishment for capital 
crimes.227 As Justice Kennedy observed, “Even if the law were to condone or 
permit this added punishment, so stark an outcome ought not to be the result of 
society’s simple unawareness or indifference.”228 
b. Legislative Harshness 
Another likely objection is that legislatures will mandate even harsher 
death row conditions than prison administrators already impose today. Critics 
who espouse this objection may care less about a democratically legitimate 
process than about a humane result. But the arguments in this Article are non-
consequentialist in nature,229 and rooted in the idea that the division of 
authority among the branches best preserves and legitimates the exercise of 
power over a people that does not agree on the existence of some higher law 
and has agreed to rely instead on majority will. The arguments are also 
grounded in a conception of what state constitutional law requires as a matter 
of the separation of powers, and on the principle of legality that could be 
violated by the administrative creation of death row. 
The consequentialist argument may also be answered on its terms, for the 
sake of broadening the discussion. A historical review of laws regarding 
methods of execution offers a useful example to show that legislatures—even 
in states that choose to retain capital punishment—are not inevitably harsh.230 
Over the last decade and a half, state legislatures have pursued less painful 
methods of execution out of what the Supreme Court has called “an earnest 
                                                                                                                     
 226 Id. (objecting to the use of permanent solitary confinement for death row and 
certain other prisoners). 
 227 See HART & SACKS, supra note 200, at 696 (describing “the ideals of an informed 
and deliberative [legislative] process”). 
 228 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 229 See supra notes 197–214 and accompanying text. 
 230 Over the last one hundred and fifty years, a dozen states abolished the death penalty 
in favor of lesser punishments; six states abolished it within the last fifteen years. States 
With and Without the Death Penalty as of July 1, 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/8KBY-
MVU6]. 
More broadly speaking, Darryl Brown has shown that legislatures over the last 
hundred years often have limited dramatically—and sometimes entirely repealed—criminal 
laws, usually with strong public support for their decriminalization choices. See Darryl K. 
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 233–45 (2007). Brown’s 
research calls explicitly into question the common claim that the politics of crime create a 
one-way ratchet in favor of greater criminalization. Id. at 223–25. 
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desire to provide for a progressively more humane manner of death.”231 
Indeed, states adopted electrocution as the method of execution in the late 
1880s after a commission established by the New York legislature concluded 
that it was “the most humane and practical method known to modern science 
of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases.”232 The Supreme 
Court observed that they had done so because of “a well-grounded belief that 
electrocution is less painful and more humane than hanging.”233 Lethal gas 
was adopted in numerous states after the Nevada legislature concluded that it 
was “the most humane manner known to modern science” at the time.234 
Later, legislatures “once again sought a more humane way to carry out death 
sentences [and] eventually adopted lethal injection.”235 In other words, 
legislatures do not always enact harsher or crueler laws, even for the most 
hated criminals. 
Furthermore, legislatures have fiscal reasons to eliminate or limit the use 
of death row. Death row segregation and isolation require additional facilities 
and resources.236 Studies have found that housing a prisoner on death row 
costs tens of thousands of dollars more per year than housing him in the 
general population. One estimate revealed that California pays $90,000 more 
to house each condemned prisoner on death row.237 For budgetary reasons, 
                                                                                                                     
 231 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 43.24 (West 2006) (“No torture, or ill treatment, or unnecessary pain, shall 
be inflicted upon a prisoner to be executed under the sentence of the law.”). 
 232 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890); see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 42; Malloy v. 
South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915). 
 233 Malloy, 237 U.S. at 185. 
 234 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015) (quoting State v. Jon, 211 P. 676, 
682 (Nev. 1923)). 
 235 Id. More recently, at least one state legislature has tried to limit the duration of the 
time inmates spend on death row. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.055 (West Supp. 2016) 
(“It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce delays in capital cases and to ensure that all 
appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved within 5 years after the 
date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit court.”). Perhaps the legislature’s concern 
was motivated by a desire to be more humane, or perhaps it sought to promote the 
efficiency and efficacy of the death penalty. 
 236 See supra note 32. 
 237 See Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 33, at S102–06 (describing $90,000 as best 
estimate available for additional costs of death row confinement); see also Ed Barnes, Just 
or Not, Cost of Death Penalty Is a Killer for State Budgets, FOX NEWS (Mar. 27, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/27/just-cost-death-penalty-killer-state-budgets/ [https:// 
perma.cc/YB3Z-3Y98] (citing $90,000 estimate). Studies also have found that solitary 
confinement generally is extremely expensive, and so when death row involves such 
isolation, its costs will naturally be much higher. See, e.g., ACLU, A SOLITARY FAILURE: 
THE WASTE, COST AND HARM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TEXAS 39 (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/SolitaryReport_2015.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RCH4-6M8J] (stating that in Texas solitary confinement “costs forty-five percent 
more than housing the same person in general population, or $61.63 per person per day 
compared to $42.46 per person per day”). 
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legislatures might abolish death row or ameliorate costly death row conditions 
such as solitary confinement. 
Fiscal concerns might motivate a legislature at least to reduce the use of 
death row, such as by creating a penal review board—akin to a parole board—
with authority to release a prisoner into the general prison population after a 
certain period of time or good behavior.238 Thus, legislatures might abolish or 
reduce death row for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. 
Admittedly, some legislatures might be reluctant to eliminate death row, 
out of fear of the political blame they would face if any inmate were to escape 
or kill again.239 Legislatures might see the political risk as too high a price to 
pay for a less cruel or costly capital punishment process.240 But evidence could 
be useful to counteract such alarmism. Experts such as Mark Cunningham, 
who authored the study of Missouri’s death row abolition experience, could 
testify that death-sentenced inmates are as a group no more dangerous than 
term-sentenced inmates.241 And publicizing cost estimates of death row 
confinement could foster public support for death row abolition. 
A legislature concerned about political backlash also could appoint a 
special commission to study death row confinement and to offer 
recommendations. This approach would make it harder for the legislatures to 
be accused of making a rash or unreasoned decision. Legislatures appointed 
similar commissions before adopting more humane methods of execution.242 
A commission could provide legislatures with analysis and recommendations 
regarding the ethical, punishment, and fiscal dimensions of death row. The 
                                                                                                                     
 238 The author thanks Professor Robert Ferguson for this thoughtful suggestion. 
Here one should note that parole decisions do not appear to implicate the problem of 
administrative imposition of punishment challenged in this Article. A parole system 
requires an express decision by the legislature to allow reductions in punishment based on 
subsequent behavior. See, e.g., Rivenbark v. Commonwealth, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa. 
1985) (“Parole is a method of rehabilitation enacted as the public policy of the 
Commonwealth pursuant to the General Assembly’s exclusive power to determine the 
penological system of the Commonwealth.”). Such a delegation of release power may be 
the only means by which legislatures can enact punishment calibrated to the goal of 
rehabilitation. Moreover, authorized decreases in punishment do not raise the legality and 
separation of powers concerns that flow from the imposition of additional, non-statutory 
punishments. 
 239 If prisoner escapes into the public are the chief concern, strictly monitoring external 
prison perimeters might address the problem even if prisoners are granted greater internal 
privileges and activities. The extent of external perimeter safeguards helps distinguish 
higher security prisons from lower ones. Perimeter security does not equate to close 
custody restrictions, though high-security prisons tend to have both. See, e.g., About  
Our Facilities, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/federal_ 
prisons.jsp [https://perma.cc/9EH8-9JZY]. 
 240 Prison administrators, too, may have such fear, suspecting that they will be blamed 
for change but not held responsible if they simply maintain the status quo. 
 241 See supra Part IV.A. 
 242 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731–32 (2015). 
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legislature could rely on the commission’s recommendations and estimates to 
support its own decision regarding death row. 
Not only would these approaches limit the risk of unthinking legislative 
cruelty, and thus assuage the consequentialist objection to legislative decision-
making, but they could foster a more reasoned and legitimate lawmaking 
process. 
B. Executive Officials and Executioner Bias 
The Article has explained why legislatures alone have competence to 
establish death row, and that this power may not be delegable. Now the Article 
will contend that even if legislatures legally could delegate this power to 
prison administrators, they should not do so. The reason is that prison 
administrators may not be suited to make fair and informed choices about 
whether death row is necessary, because their perspective may be affected by 
their dual role in the execution process—as both executioners and 
policymakers.243 The Article will describe this risk as one of possible 
“executioner bias.”244 
Prison administrators, such as death row wardens and directors of 
departments of corrections, often serve two roles in the execution process.245 
As part of their responsibilities under state law, they may be required to play 
direct roles in the execution process, by ordering and supervising executions. 
According to criminologist Robert Johnson, “The plain fact is that formal 
executioners, whether shrouded in secrecy or working more or less as public 
figures, do not orchestrate the execution process. The warden or his designate 
does.”246 At the same time, these officials are often involved in setting or 
                                                                                                                     
 243 Other reasons may exist why prison administrators would retain death row, which 
this Article does not explore because they do not show why administrators would be worse 
decision-makers than legislatures. One of these other reasons is simple risk-aversion. If 
officials lessen the restraints imposed on death-sentenced prisoners, and one of the 
prisoners kills an inmate or guard, or tries to escape, the prison administrators will be 
blamed for not keeping the prisoners in harsher conditions. This agency problem will give 
administrators an incentive to maintain the status quo to avoid blame. Legislatures, 
however, would face the same incentive not to change. 
 244 This term is the author’s own. 
 245 The prison administrators, who would be involved in the policy decisions regarding 
how death-sentenced inmates should be confined, must be distinguished from prison 
personnel who lack policy-making power and who may not be involved in the executions 
of the inmates they guard. 
 246 JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 126. Death row wardens are personally involved in the 
execution process. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100(b) (West 2009) (“Besides 
the warden or deputy warden and such number of correctional staff as he thinks necessary, 
the following persons may be present at the execution: the Commissioner of 
Correction . . . .”); CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 6.15(9)–(12) 
(2014), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0615.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8CQ-
M2WS] (requiring the warden to supervise personally the execution process, including by 
escorting the executioner(s) and witnesses, inspecting the condemned prisoners’ physical 
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implementing confinement policies for death-sentenced prisoners.247 As 
Johnson explains, 
[The execution] process starts on death row, the bleak and oppressive “prison 
within a prison” where the condemned are housed for years awaiting 
execution . . . and culminates in the deathwatch . . . supervised by a team of 
correctional officers . . . who typically report directly to the prison warden.248 
Presuming that the death penalty requires death row may make it easier 
psychologically for prison administrators to fulfill their lethal roles in the 
execution process249 in at least three ways. First, the segregation and isolation 
of death-sentenced inmates helps foster an image of death-sentenced inmates 
as uniquely vicious and dangerous. This image makes executions easier to 
rationalize on retribution or incapacitation grounds. Second, death row 
conditions of segregation and isolation may help break down empathy for 
condemned inmates, making it easier to think that their deaths do not matter or 
even that they deserve to die. Third, imposing death row automatically and 
invariably for each death-sentenced inmate shifts responsibility for the 
judgment of the appropriateness of such pre-execution confinement to 
sentencing authorities, implying further that death row is part of the just 
retribution decided upon by those authorities. In these ways, the existence of 
                                                                                                                     
restraints, inspecting the IV connection in the prisoner, and ordering the lethal injection to 
be administered). Other states are similar. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5) 
(2015) (“The warden shall . . . select the person to perform the execution, and the warden 
or the warden’s designee shall supervise the execution.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 
(2013) (requiring that “[a]t the execution there shall be present the Director [of the 
Department of Corrections] or an assistant”). The process may take a toll on wardens, as 
some have attested. See, e.g., Ron McAndrew, Former Florida Warden Haunted by 
Botched Execution, DEATH PENALTY FOCUS, http://deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=293 
[https://perma.cc/UPU5-I6] (“During my tenure as Warden at Florida State Prison it was 
my duty to oversee the executions of three men: John Earl Bush, John Mills Jr. and Pedro 
Medina. Remembering every gruesome detail of their deaths is haunting.”). 
 247 See, e.g., ARK. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AR002(I) (1988), 
http://adc.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/AR002.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWB9-UU2Y] (“The 
Director shall delegate authority to the Unit Wardens/Center Supervisors/Administrators or 
appropriate administrative designees to act on all matters related to the unit/center 
operational areas, to manage all programs, activities, inmates, personnel and volunteers 
connected with the unit/center/operational areas.”); CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 1.3(15)(B) (2015), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ 
ad0103.pdf [https://perma.cc/8678-LH9T] (providing for input by units that will be 
affected by policy changes). 
 248 JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 126. 
 249 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United 
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable 
as a principal.”). 
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death row may make it easier psychologically for prison administrators to 
direct executions. 
1. Inmates As Savages 
Segregation of inmates on death row reinforces an image of the death-
sentenced inmates as dangerous savages. Justice Brennan viewed the denial of 
common humanity as an inevitable aspect of capital punishment. Concurring 
in Furman v. Georgia, he wrote that “[t]he calculated killing of a human being 
by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person’s 
humanity.”250 He argued that the death penalty marked the condemned as 
categorically different from other prisoners and no longer “member[s] of the 
human family.”251 
Indeed, researchers have found that persons who must assist executions 
tend to engage in psychological self-protection by “dehumaniz[ing]” capital 
murderers as “devoid of any human qualities.”252 Dehumanization may be 
expressed by assertions that, “Murderers who receive the death penalty have 
forfeited the right to be considered full human beings.”253 
Social and psychological studies have shown that participation in killing 
creates enormous psychological stress, even when fully legal.254 Executioners 
(and others who must kill, such as soldiers) develop psychological coping 
mechanisms that limit their inhibitions and the psychological impact or “moral 
injury” caused by their lethal roles.255 
Researchers have studied the kinds of coping mechanisms employed by 
prison personnel involved in the execution process. In a study published in 
2005, Stanford researchers visited three penitentiaries where executions were 
carried out,256 and studied the moral disengagement levels of execution team 
members, support team members who consoled the victims’ families and the 
                                                                                                                     
 250 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 380 (emphasis omitted). 
 253 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 254 See, e.g., RACHEL M. MACNAIR, PERPETRATION-INDUCED TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KILLING 31–43 (2002). 
 255 Jonathan Shay, who studied the phenomenon of “moral injury,” writes in a book on 
American soldiers in Vietnam that the enemy soldiers were “called madmen and animals 
and were said to lack any emotions.” JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT 
TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER 106 (1994). Saira Mohamed has contributed 
important analysis of perpetrator trauma and the tendency of perpetrators of killings to 
rationalize their actions. See Saira Mohamed, Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma 
and Mass Atrocity, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1185–86 (2015). 
 256 Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 377–78. The study focused on 
three types of personnel, including support team members and persons directly 
participating in the lethal actions. Id. at 371, 378. The study concluded that “[e]xecutioners 
made heaviest use of dehumanization, security and economic justifications and disavowal 
of personal responsibility, but somewhat lesser use of moral justification.” Id. at 382. 
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condemned inmates, and prison guards with no involvement in the execution 
process.257 The researchers found that “[t]o negate moral self-sanctions, 
executioners do not focus on the taking of life, but rather seek solace in the 
dignity of the process and in the view that condemned killers have a bestial 
aspect to their nature and executing them will protect the public.”258 All three 
groups—executioners, supporters, and guards—“dehumanized” the prisoners 
to some degree, and the executioners did so the most.259 Building upon earlier 
studies, the researchers concluded that “the offenders tend to be dehumanized 
by those who have to take a human life.”260 
The Stanford study illuminated the psychological tendencies of 
executioners, and its findings could suggest that prison administrators who 
direct executioners also might treat death-sentenced prisoners in ways that 
dehumanize them. As Lyon and Cunningham have noted, segregation on death 
row labels the death row inmate as a vicious criminal who has committed a 
hideous crime for which he must live permanently apart from others, awaiting 
execution.261 His segregation and isolation confirm the sense that he is 
dangerous, vicious, and unfit for human interaction.262 The isolation, 
restriction of personal hygiene, and physical and mental stagnation increases 
the sense of death row defendants as bestial and different from human beings 
who retain the right to life. Indeed, such treatment may push inmates actually 
to become the enemy of humanity that they were first labeled to be.263 
Some prisons may use additional visual markers as well as physical 
barriers to set death-sentenced inmates apart. In Florida, for example, death 
                                                                                                                     
 257 Id. at 371. 
 258 Id. at 386–87 (emphasis added). The executioners, support group members, and 
prison guards sought to avoid moral injury in other ways as well, such as by citing the 
“moral, economic, and societal security justifications” for the death penalty. Id. at 371, 
381, 387. 
 259 Id. at 383. 
 260 Id. at 387–88. 
 261 See Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that after mainstreaming in 
Missouri, “efforts were made to separate from the self-perpetuating mythology of 
condemned inmates by modifying the terminology used to refer to these inmates: ‘death 
row inmates’ was replaced by ‘capital punishment inmates’”); cf. JOHNSON, supra note 
137, at 218 (“Prisoners on death row are sometimes explicitly referred to as ‘dead men.’”). 
 262 See, e.g., Michael J. Osofsky & Howard J. Osofsky, The Psychological Experience 
of Security Officers Who Work with Executions, 65 PSYCHIATRY 358, 365 (2002) (noting 
that some officers who worked with executions justified the death penalty by “[s]tressing 
the heinous nature of the inmates’ crimes [and] referenced some of the horrid acts of 
inmates on Death Row”); John L. Worrall & Robert G. Morris, Inmate Custody Levels and 
Prison Rule Violations, 91 PRISON J. 131, 148 (2011) (suggesting that imposition of a 
custody level “labels” an inmate and stating that the classification of the inmate leads to 
assumptions about him). 
 263 To the extent that death row conditions of segregation and isolation prevent these 
inmates from being in contact with other persons and lead to their psychological and 
physical dysfunction, they may become a self-fulfilling prophecy that the prisoners will be 
unfit to function in society, even the limited society that exists in a prison community. 
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row inmates are distinguished visibly from other inmates because they must 
wear orange t-shirts.264 These superficial distinctions serve as a reminder of 
the crimes these prisoners have committed, setting them apart from the rest of 
humanity and even the prison community. 
By adopting death row policies that require the automatic isolation of 
prisoners without individual evaluations, prison officials avoid the need for 
personal contacts that might cast doubt on their view of these prisoners as 
savages, and might reveal their common humanity. By marking death-
sentenced inmates as savages who must be segregated and isolated for the 
safety of others, prison administrators may find it easier to justify killing them 
on incapacitation grounds, or even for reasons of retribution or general 
deterrence. Moreover, to the extent the condemned inmates are segregated 
from others and unable to contribute to society (even prison society), their 
continued existence may seem a waste and their execution may be rationalized 
on economic grounds as well. 
2. The Destruction of Empathy 
Death row also may serve to break down empathy and to make executions 
easier to perform. Insofar as death row helps prison administrators and 
guards265 dehumanize prisoners as savages, it may limit the officials’ empathy 
for the prisoners when they suffer. And death row conditions also create a 
psychological and apparent divide between prison officials and inmates. As 
Craig Haney has shown in his seminal work on the “empathic divide” that 
enables white juries to impose death sentences on black defendants,266 racial, 
cultural, and situational differences can break down empathy.267  
                                                                                                                     
 264 FLA. Death Row, supra note 46 (“Death Row inmates can be distinguished from 
other inmates by their orange t-shirts.”). 
 265 The Article uses the term “prison guards,” in reference to prison employees who 
interact on a daily basis with prisoners, providing their meals, transportation, and the like. 
Though these employees might also be referred to as “correctional officers,” the Article 
uses the term “prison guards” to avoid confusion between their work and that of “prison 
administrators,” who have authority to establish overarching rules for the prison and who 
may but need not come in contact with prisoners on a daily basis. 
 266 See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized 
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573 (extending Haney’s 
prior work on the empathic divide). 
 267 Sharon Dolovich has argued that “[i]n today’s carceral regime, . . . to be a prisoner 
is to occupy a morally degraded state, in which any harm you suffer counts for nothing.” 
Dolovich, supra note 139, at 312. Given the disproportionate number of blacks who are 
convicted of crime, Dolovich has implied that racial animus may be a factor in the 
imposition of harsh penal conditions. See id. at 313 (“Certainly, the drivers of exclusion 
and control are complex, and not reducible to any one variable, be it race or otherwise. But 
it surely bears noting that, as segregation based exclusively on race has become 
constitutionally impermissible, the carceral system—which allows for both the physical 
removal and moral degradation of targeted individuals—has dramatically expanded and 
disproportionately targeted people of color.”). If death row conditions are made 
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Segregation and isolation of death-sentenced inmates may hinder empathy 
for the condemned and the shared suffering it could generate. When death-
sentenced inmates are prevented from engaging in communal activities, 
supervising officials (prison administrators and, more frequently, prison 
guards) do not have to see the inmates behaving toward others with generosity, 
humor, or friendship. They also avoid seeing the inmates fight with one 
another, or display fear of injury at the hands of other inmates—negative 
actions and emotions but nonetheless ones that manifest the humanity and 
personality of the condemned. Not seeing how death-sentenced inmates 
interact with others may make it less likely that prison officials will relate to 
them or empathize with them. Limitations on visits between death-sentenced 
inmates and their families also may shield officials from witnessing the 
prisoners’ love for their families and the suffering the families feel as they 
anticipate the prisoners’ executions. The avoidance of empathy may cultivate a 
team of prison officials less troubled by executions and more willing to 
participate in the execution process directed by prison administrators. 
Some scholars, most notably Sharon Dolovich in recent years, have 
written about how our penal system excludes criminals from society and from 
the rights that society accords.268 Death row takes exclusion a step further and 
bars death-sentenced inmates even from the general prison community. Over 
time, the strictures of death row may deprive inmates of all personal 
relationships. For the prohibition on contact visits, and the restrictions on 
visitation generally, eventually may break down even those familial bonds.269 
The loosening of the prisoner-family bonds may make the families less pained 
or angry as a result of the execution process. Prison administrators in turn may 
be more accepting of their lethal roles when the execution process does not 
appear to cause so much pain to innocent family members. 
                                                                                                                     
intentionally harsh as punishment, Dolovich’s argument would seem to raise a serious 
concern. But the strongest evidence of the harshness of death row conditions—the 
argument that they force some inmates to “volunteer” for execution—undercuts a racial 
animus claim at least in the context of death row; white inmates “volunteer” at a rate ten 
times that of black inmates. See DPIC “Volunteers,” supra note 7. This disproportionate 
willingness of whites to speed their deaths may reflect many factors, including, perhaps, 
their greater incidence of guilt. It does, however, undercut any suggestion that death row 
conditions disproportionately burden black inmates. 
 268 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 139. 
 269 See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 599 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(recounting expert testimony stating that contact visitation is crucial to retention of 
prisoners’ familial bonds and that denial of contact visitation contributes to the break-up of 
prisoners’ marriages); see also Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 126, at 11–
12 (noting that the current prison warden for Virginia’s death row has stated that he would 
allow a contact visit by an immediate family member only if a death row inmate were on 
his deathbed). 
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3. Deflection of Responsibility 
By treating death row as tethered to death sentences, prison administrators 
can deny responsibility for the entire execution process, including the 
dehumanizing conditions of pre-execution confinement. Death row becomes 
an inevitable correlate of a death sentence, and the result of decisions by other 
authorities: the legislatures that authorized the capital penalty, the jury and 
judge who imposed the capital sentence, and the inmate who committed the 
capital offense. The “tether” between death sentences and death row270 
provides cover for prison administrators to distance themselves from the 
prisoners they will have to execute. The Stanford study mentioned above 
found that all prison personnel involved in executions strongly denied 
responsibility for the execution decision.271 They emphasized that they had no 
role in imposing the death sentences.272 As the Stanford researchers observed 
with regard to executioners: “Displacement of responsibility absolves 
executioners from being judged personally for carrying out the orders of 
society, and shifts responsibility to the heinous nature of the crimes and to 
sentencing requirements . . . .”273 
Arguments in the recent Prieto case illustrate how prison administrators 
may seek to shift responsibility to sentencing authorities. During oral 
argument in October 2014, the Virginia Director of Corrections argued that the 
segregation and solitary confinement of death row prisoners was warranted 
because they had been found by the jury or judge to pose a risk of future 
dangerousness or to have committed particularly “vile” crimes (and thus 
presumably to require either permanent incapacitation or harsh retribution).274 
He made clear that death row placement resulted solely and entirely from the 
sentence.275 Indeed, he explained, even if the court required the prison to 
                                                                                                                     
 270 According to the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Prieto v. Clarke, “tethered to 
the death sentence in Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death row.” 780 F.3d 245, 
254 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 271 Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 371, 381, 386–87. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. at 379. 
 274 Oral Argument at 13:40, Prieto, 780 F.3d 245 (No. 13-8021), 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments#audiocurrent [https:// 
perma.cc/6C5E-E8UZ] (arguing that death row placement is due to the sentence which is 
based on one of two determinations: risk of future dangerousness or that the crime was 
particularly “vile”). Note that the required finding is in addition to a finding that the 
defendant has committed an enumerated capital crime. See supra note 81; see also Oral 
Argument, supra (Motz, J.) (referring to the “death row sentence”); John Woestendiek, 
Prison Official Backs Segregation of Death-Row Inmates, PHILLY.COM (June 28, 1986), 
http://articles.philly.com/1986-06-28/news/26045740_1_death-row-inmates-state-prison-
graterford [https://perma.cc/9Z5K-VDUK] (quoting official as stating that “our philosophy 
is that the sentence overrides the other factors because it’s the only sentence that leads to 
death”). 
 275 The director’s argument, and death row policies of segregation and isolation 
generally, thus contradict Robert Blecker’s claim that prison officials “consciously ignor[e] 
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assess death-sentenced inmates individually for security risk, the prison would 
give them an automatic maximum score based on their death sentences that 
would secure their placement on death row.276 In other words, the prison 
would assume that a capital sentence meant that death row was necessary. This 
approach enabled Virginia prison officials to place responsibility for the entire 
pre-execution process on the legislature, judge, and jury, for imposing a death 
sentence for a capital crime.277 
In all the foregoing ways, death row segregation and isolation may help 
prison administrators reduce the psychological burden of their participation in 
executions. Contrary to presumptions that prison administrators will base their 
death row policies on institutional competence, prison administrators may be 
predisposed to impose conditions that will limit their own “moral injury” and 
psychological stress. They may not give up longstanding death row policies, 
even in the face of mounting evidence that the segregation of all death-
sentenced prisoners is not necessary for security reasons.278 And instead of 
judging whether any retributive and deterrent purposes require death row, 
                                                                                                                     
prisoners’ criminal records” and thus “unwittingly help sever the essential retributive 
connection between the past crime committed and the present punishment experienced.” 
Blecker, supra note 34, at 1171. 
 276 The prison’s approach to noncapital inmates is very different. See VA. OPERATING 
PROCEDURE, supra note 70, at 830.2(III) (defining prisoner “suitability” for a particular 
custody level as “[a] reasoned, professional judgment regarding an offender’s ability to 
perform in a certain security level or facility environment; it calls for a discerning 
judgment relative to length of sentence, crime, prior record, as well as sociological, 
medical, and psychological considerations. Suitability differs with each individual offender 
depending upon the offender’s facility, parole eligibility, Mandatory Parole Release Date 
or Good Time Release Date.”); id. at 830.2(IV)(A)(1) (stating that offenders are to be 
“assigned to the least restrictive security level necessary and not subjected to excessive 
control and management”). 
 277 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Prieto fosters this impression that the sentencing 
authorities are responsible for confinement conditions. See Prieto, 780 F.3d at 254 (stating 
that “tethered to the death sentence in Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death 
row”). 
 278 Corrections authorities have ready access to this information. See Lyon & 
Cunningham, supra note 16, at 8 n.44 (“Correction departments belong to common 
associations and accrediting organizations, disseminate statistical experience and research 
findings with each other, and are guided by common judicial determinations.” (quoting 
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital 
Sentencing: Individualization, Generalization, Relevance, and Scientific Standards, 29 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 522 (2002))). Recently, the Association of State Corrections 
Administrators released a thorough study and critique of the widespread use of solitary 
confinement, including for death row prisoners. See ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY, supra note 13; 
Williams, supra note 13. 
Notably, former corrections officials recently spoke out in an amicus brief against the 
use of solitary confinement for death-sentenced prisoners. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Correctional Experts in Support of Appellee, supra note 54, at 1–3. But they did so only 
after ceasing to serve in lethal roles. Id. (describing past experience with death-sentenced 
prisoners). 
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prison administrators may hold onto death row in order to reassure themselves 
that these and other purposes require execution. 
C. The Role of the Courts 
This Article thus far has focused on the role of legislatures and prison 
administrators regarding death row. Challenging the existing reliance on 
administrative decision-making has been its central aim. Now the Article will 
turn to the role that courts may play in ensuring that the allocation of 
decisional authority remains within constitutional bounds. 
Prior scholars and courts have explored important limits on the harshness 
of death row imposed by the Eighth Amendment,279 the Due Process 
Clause,280 and international law.281 They have entirely overlooked, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 279 Some of the most significant challenges to death row conditions have been raised 
under the Eighth Amendment. Andrea Lyon and Mark Cunningham have argued that 
automatic and permanent isolation on death row violates the Eighth Amendment because it 
is unnecessary and cruel. See Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 13 (“[T]he long-term 
segregation and deprivations of death row have been shown time and time again to have 
deleterious and even debilitating effects upon inmates, thereby rendering death row cruel. 
Because the stark conditions of isolation and deprivation of death row are not suffered by 
the vast majority of prison inmates, they are unusual as well.”). In an ongoing lawsuit, 
prisoners on Virginia’s death row claim that Virginia’s policy of sending all prisoners 
sentenced to death into solitary confinement on death row violates the Eighth Amendment. 
See Complaint at 1–2, Porter v. Clarke, No. 1:14-CV-01588 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 2014). 
Their case has come before District Judge Leonie Brinkema, the same judge who granted a 
fellow death row prisoner’s claim for due process relief in 2013 (only to be reversed 
recently by the Fourth Circuit). Though the claim will be difficult to win because such 
harsh treatment of death-row prisoners is not “unusual,” as the Eighth Amendment 
requires, Judge Brinkema has already expressed doubt in the 2013 case that Virginia prison 
administrators have a sufficient penological purpose to justify automatically and 
permanently sending all death-sentenced prisoners into solitary confinement on death row. 
See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 
2013) (stating that the death row policy “further[ed] few, if any, legitimate penological 
goals”), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Scholars and death penalty 
opponents also have cited the harsh conditions of death row to argue that the death penalty 
itself is unconstitutionally cruel, contending that protracted isolation on death row followed 
by execution exceeds the punishment permitted by the Constitution. See, e.g., Sun, supra 
note 2.  
To date, however, no court has held the Eighth Amendment to forbid the segregation 
or isolation of prisoners on death row. Several federal courts have issued consent decrees to 
remedy unusually extreme conditions of death row confinement caused by, for example, 
severe lack of sanitation or extreme temperatures, but these orders have not barred the 
isolation of death row prisoners or questioned the propriety of a separate death row. The 
use of such decrees, moreover, is controversial. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
365 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (objecting that “the federal judiciary has for the last 
half century been exercising ‘equitable’ powers and issuing structural decrees entirely out 
of line with its constitutional mandate”). 
 280 Other challenges to death row have been presented under the Due Process Clause. 
A prisoner challenging confinement conditions under due process must show that he has a 
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whether prison administrators have institutional authority to establish death 
row in the first place. The Article now will address that question and will show 
that at least in some states, the separation of powers forbids administrative 
creation of death row. Additionally, the Ex Post Facto Clause may limit 
legislatures’ ability to rubber-stamp current administrative death row policies. 
The role that courts may play enforcing these constitutional limits merits a 
central place in death row scholarship and litigation. 
1. Separation of Powers As a Limit on Death Row 
In most states, statutes do not require or even address the creation of death 
row.282 Prison administrators have established death row based only on their 
general authority to create custody conditions. In Virginia, for example, prison 
administrators have cited two statutes to support their creation of death row. 
One statute grants general authority to the Director of Corrections,283 while the 
other requires the Director to maintain a system of classification for evaluating 
prisoners according to factors such as “background, aptitude, education, and 
risk.”284 Neither of these statutes authorizes prison administrators to hold 
death-sentenced prisoners in worse conditions based only on the crimes that 
they committed. 
In states like Virginia, where prison administrators have no express 
authority to establish stricter conditions for death-sentenced prisoners, courts 
should hold that the creation of death row by prison policy exceeds the 
legitimate bounds of administrative authority. Unless a statute expressly 
mandates death row, the law should not be read to allow prison administrators 
the power to establish it. For any such prescription of additional punishment 
ought to be express in order to satisfy the principle of legality and the rule of 
lenity that helps enforce it. Moreover, though courts normally might defer to 
                                                                                                                     
liberty interest in avoiding those conditions. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 
(2005). The courts have not recognized a state-created or constitutionally created liberty 
interest in avoiding death row. To the contrary, in the Virginia case mentioned above, the 
Fourth Circuit has held that death-sentenced prisoners have no liberty interest in avoiding 
solitary confinement on death row, where such death row confinement is prescribed by 
“state law” or prison policy. See Prieto, 780 F.3d at 254. This decision will not be 
overturned, because Virginia executed Alfred Prieto on October 1, 2015, rendering his 
request for the Supreme Court’s intervention moot. See Cristian Farias, Solitary 
Confinement Case Dies with Death-Row Inmate’s Execution, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/alfredo-prieto-solitary-confinement_ 
562227ece4b02f6a900c9010 [https://perma.cc/U3HJ-QSB5]; see also Prieto v. Clarke, 136 
S. Ct. 319 (2015) (mem.) (dismissing petition for certiorari in Prieto v. Clarke as moot). 
 281 Finally, some courts have concluded that death row conditions violate international 
law. See supra note 3 (citing decisions). Courts in the United States, however, have not 
barred death row on international law grounds. 
 282 See supra Part III.C. 
 283 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (2013). 
 284 Id. § 53.1-32.1(A). 
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an agency’s interpretation of a statute governing its conduct,285 a claim by 
prison administrators that a statute silent regarding death row implicitly grants 
authority for it would be an unreasonable reading of such a statute and would 
not deserve deference. It would be unreasonable to claim that the legislature 
intended by silence to delegate a quintessentially legislative function.286 
Moreover, if a state were to enact a statute authorizing prison 
administrators to impose death row for punitive reasons, some state 
constitutions would forbid such a delegation of power. The permissibility of 
such delegation depends on state law and state courts have divided over 
similar issues. For example, state courts have split over whether a legislature 
may delegate to an agency the power to specify what controlled substances 
come within the purview of a drug law. The Louisiana Supreme Court, among 
other courts, has held such a statute invalid as an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative authority.287 The court has explained: “[W]here a statute vests 
arbitrary discretion in a board or an official without prescribing standards of 
guidance there is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the 
executive branch of the government.”288 Other state courts have agreed.289 On 
the other hand, the Alabama Supreme Court has deemed such a statute 
permissible, concluding that “it is the legislative will, not the [administrative 
agency’s], which states that, following a controlled classification, certain 
conduct related to that controlled substance constitutes a public offense.”290 In 
the case of a delegation of authority to impose death row, it seems likely that, 
                                                                                                                     
 285 At least in the federal system, prison administrators usually would receive 
deference for their interpretation of ambiguous statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); Auth. to Advance 
Funds to Cuban Detainees to Purchase Commissary Items, 12 Op. O.L.C. 64, 65 (1988) 
(“The deference that has been accorded the Bureau of Prisons in construing and applying 
the statute which it administers is consistent with the general administrative law principles 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45)). 
 286 Even without invocation of the rule of lenity, the choice of prison administrators to 
establish death row might be considered an unreasonable interpretation of their statutorily 
granted authority to maintain prison security and order. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2707 (2015) (“Chevron directs courts to accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of 
an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers. Even under this deferential standard, 
however, ‘agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014))). 
 287 State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (La. 1980); see also id. at 1085 (“Article 
II, § 1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution divides the powers of government into three 
separate branches: legislative, executive and judicial. Article II, § 2 provides that no one of 
these branches may exercise power belonging to either of the others.”). 
 288 Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d at 1086. 
 289 See Sundberg v. State, 216 S.E.2d 332, 333 (Ga. 1975); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 
774, 779 (Miss. 1974); State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D. 1970); State v. 
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). 
 290 Ex parte McCurley, 390 So. 2d 25, 29 (Ala. 1980). 
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at least in some states, such a delegation would be deemed constitutionally 
impermissible. 
If prison administrators claim the power to establish death row not for 
punitive reasons, but based on security concerns, courts should reject and 
refuse to grant deference to that reasoning.291 To be sure, federal courts 
usually defer to prison administrators’ choices about how to manage prisons 
and presume that administrators’ choices are reasoned judgments based on 
administrative expertise.292 But prison administrators should not be presumed 
to act reasonably and based on their institutional expertise when they place an 
entire class of prisoners in solitary confinement based on their sentence 
alone.293 The automatic and permanent isolation of death-sentenced prisoners 
on its face does not involve the use of expert judgment upon which 
administrative deference is premised. Instead, it is a sentence-based and 
presumptively punitive measure.294 Courts should require concrete evidence 
                                                                                                                     
 291 State and federal courts differ in their approaches to agency determinations. As a 
general matter, several scholars have noted the need for more piercing review. Eric Berger, 
for example, has argued that courts ought to consider more closely institutional behavior 
before granting deference based on assumptions of institutional competence. See Eric 
Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 465, 470 (2013). Louis Virelli has argued for similarly stricter scrutiny in the 
exercise of arbitrary-and-capricious or “hard look” review of administrative decisions in 
the federal courts. See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 724–25 (2014) (arguing that the appropriate level of 
deference should be determined by “a collection of more particularized inquiries into 
specific components of agency decision making,” such as “record building, reason giving, 
input scope and quality, and rationality”). 
 292 See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) 
(recognizing the “wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison 
administrators”). 
 293 The district court in the Virginia death row case mentioned earlier in this Article 
offers a model. In considering whether Virginia’s death row policy imposed an atypical 
and significant hardship on death-sentenced inmates that would implicate procedural due 
process rights, the court asked whether the categorically harsh treatment of death-sentenced 
inmates bore “a rational relationship to legitimate penological interests.” Prieto v. Clarke, 
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), rev’d on other 
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Though the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that the district court should not have considered the hardship question because the 
prisoner had failed to show, as a predicate matter, that death row infringed on any liberty 
interest, the district court’s analysis remains a useful guide should a liberty interest be 
found in another case or by another court. 
 294 Whether a restriction is punitive or regulatory is not always obvious. The Supreme 
Court has noted some features that can help draw the distinction: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
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that such categorical treatment is needed for security purposes, before 
accepting as an administrative necessity such a punitive provision.295 In these 
ways, courts may prevent prison administrators from illegitimately 
augmenting the punishment for capital crimes. 
2. Ex Post Facto Limitations on Death Row 
If state courts invalidate administrative policies creating death row, 
legislatures will be forced to enact legislation if they wish to preserve it. 
Importantly, the Ex Post Facto Clause may bar legislatures from simply rubber 
stamping under statutory law the death row practices that now occur based on 
administrative policy. Specifically, the Ex Post Facto Clause may forbid 
legislatures from requiring solitary confinement prior to execution for the 
category of prisoners who have already committed their capital crimes.296 
The premise for this argument lies in an 1890 case in which the Supreme 
Court invalidated on Ex Post Facto grounds a Colorado statute mandating 
solitary confinement for all prisoners sentenced to death.297 A prisoner had 
challenged the statute on Ex Post Facto grounds, because he had committed 
his capital crime before the statute went into effect. To determine whether the 
Ex Post Facto Clause applied, the Court considered whether the law amplified 
punishment. Rejecting the state’s argument that the imposition of solitary 
confinement was “a mere unimportant regulation as to the safe-keeping of the 
                                                                                                                     
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in 
differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal 
nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its 
face. 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (footnotes omitted). 
 295 Prisoners challenging death row would bear the initial burden of bringing evidence 
to the attention of the courts that calls death row into doubt. Experts also might weigh in as 
amici, as they did in the Prieto case. See supra note 126.  
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit’s decision reversing the district court, though not on 
this point, may have perpetuated the idea that prison officials should receive unthinking 
deference with regard to death row, even in the face of contrary evidence. See, e.g., Larry 
O’Dell, Court OKs Automatic Solitary for Virginia Death-Row Inmates, CNS NEWS  
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/court-oks-automatic-solitary-virginia-
death-row-inmates [https://perma.cc/6YEZ-AQ49] (“[T]he appeals court agreed with state 
attorneys who argued that prison officials are better equipped than judges to assess security 
risks and adopt appropriate safeguards.”). 
 296 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto 
Law . . . .”). The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of penal statutes 
that disadvantage the offender affected by them. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (5 Dall.) 386, 
390–92 (1798); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). Separate from this 
limitation on the states, the Constitution protects against ex post facto laws by Congress. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”).  
 297 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1890). The statute also prohibited the warden 
from warning the prisoner of which day had been chosen for his execution. Id. at 163–64. 
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prisoner,” the Court held that mandatory isolation constituted “an additional 
punishment of the most important and painful character.”298 Furthermore, the 
Court found that the isolation was not ameliorated by the fact that the prisoner 
could have certain visitors, noting that administrative authorities could deny 
such visits in their discretion.299 The Court acknowledged a plausible 
retributive and deterrent purpose in the mandatory isolation—noting that it 
was designed “to mark [the condemned prisoners] as examples of the just 
punishment of the worst crimes of the human race”300—but held that such 
punishment could not be imposed retroactively.301 The Court’s analysis thus 
forbade a legislature from mandating as punishment what prison wardens were 
already free to impose on individual prisoners.302 
The Supreme Court has never overruled that 1890 decision and it appears 
to remain good law.303 Thus, if legislatures wished to retain death row after 
invalidation of an administrative death row policy by a court, it is not clear 
that they could simply revive the administrative policy of death row isolation. 
If courts were to combine this understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause with 
a strict understanding of the separation of powers, many of the 3,000 prisoners 
now awaiting execution would have to be removed from death row,304 and the 
                                                                                                                     
 298 Id. at 167, 171. 
 299 Id. at 167–69. 
 300 Id. at 169–70; cf. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that “the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of 
uncertainty may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself”). 
 301 In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 174. 
 302 In two later decisions, the Supreme Court upheld statutes imposing solitary 
confinement on death-sentenced inmates, making clear that the constitutional problem lay 
in retroactive application of such harsh restrictions and not in the restrictions themselves. 
See McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158–59 (1891); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 
483, 493–96 (1890). 
 303 Recently, a court cited In re Medley in a case involving the transfer of a death-
sentenced prisoner into solitary confinement. In re Gentry, 245 P.3d 766, 768 (Wash. 
2010) (citing In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160). The court in that case found no ex post facto 
violation because “solitary confinement was contemplated by state law at the time of [the 
prisoner’s] crime and sentence.” Id. at 767. The court stated that to prevail on his ex post 
facto claim, the inmate had to show that he had a liberty interest created by state law in 
avoiding the harsh conditions of death row confinement; for this proposition the court 
relied on its understanding of the due process principles set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472 (1995). See In re Gentry, 245 P.3d at 768 (citing In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 
392–93 (2001) (citing Conner, 515 U.S. at 484)). Under this approach, the court concluded 
that the inmate could not prevail, because state law granted prison authorities “broad 
discretion over conditions of inmate housing” and the inmate had “no legitimate claim to 
future entitlement or liberty interest in [less severe housing] conditions.” Id. at 769. The 
court offered little justification for its layering of the limitations on due process claims and 
ex post facto protections. Nor did the court explain how the mere “contemplation” of 
solitary confinement under statutory law was sufficient to satisfy the principle of legality’s 
requirement of a clear and public prescription of punishment. 
 304 To be sure, not all courts may apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to limit legislatures 
that wish to mandate harsh death row conditions. Some courts might conclude that the 
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newly retained death row would have to remain empty until filled by the 
newly convicted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many scholars have argued that death row conditions are senselessly cruel. 
But most scholars and courts have accepted death row as an inevitable aspect 
of capital punishment. Few scholars have addressed whether death row is 
necessary and what purposes it might serve. As execution delays drag into 
years and decades, the need for a reasoned and democratically legitimate 
decision as to this significant de facto punishment becomes more pressing. 
Additional punishment of prisoners condemned to die should not be imposed 
unthinkingly. Justice Stevens has argued that the death penalty’s continued 
existence in America reflects “habit and inattention rather than an acceptable 
deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of administering that 
penalty against its identifiable benefits.”305 Abolitionists and advocates of 
capital punishment alike should agree that the death penalty and its 
implementation—including the use of death row to augment punishment—
should not occur without a deliberate and democratically legitimate process 
that gives voice to the relevant punitive, humanitarian, and fiscal concerns. 
The question whether to retain death row does not need an empirical 
answer from prison administrators about what security requires—for that 
question has been answered by studies showing that categorically and 
permanently sending all death-sentenced prisoners into segregation and 
isolation is unnecessary. Instead, the question whether to retain death row 
requires a normative answer about whether death row serves legitimate 
punishment objectives or imposes too much undeserved suffering. That 
normative answer must be provided by legislatures, not prison administrators.  
                                                                                                                     
prohibition on retroactive punishment is not violated by a legislative mandate that simply 
confirms what has long been the existing administrative practice, despite In re Medley. But 
a simple expectation of cruelty should not translate that treatment into a legitimate state 
action; if that were the case, then legislators could decide to openly permit prison rape for 
child molesters, too, as an expected and therefore retroactively valid part of punishment. 
 305 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
